Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-93-184
Friday
24 September 1993

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FBIS-EEU-93-184 *24 September 1993*

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Socialist Press Views Economic Reform Program

AU2409082393 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 21 Sep 93 p 1

[Article by Ergert Tirana and Luan Shahollari: "Albania at Zero Level for the Next Three Years"]

[Text] It took 500 days for Prime Minister Meksi to finally come up with a sort of program for the main guidelines of the economic reform, if that is what we can call his speech to the expanded meeting of the Democratic Party [PD] National Council on 17 September, published in RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE the following day. We say "sort of program," because the subhead, "Medium-Term Macroeconomic Policy 1993-1996" does not suggest a program. Nor is it known whether this "sort of program" has been approved by the government or is simply Mr. Meksi's speech, or whether it will be submitted to the People's Assembly for approval.

Without a shadow of a doubt, we can call this program a variant of "tightening our belts a further notch," "further tightening the savings regime," and "relying entirely (or mostly) on our own resources." One cannot find a single word or figure about the wages or incomes of the population in general. The program even boasts that the minimum wage in institutions financed by the state budget has risen by a factor of 2.2 in 1993 compared with 1992, "forgetting" to add how much prices have risen and how much real wages have fallen. The prime minister says that he will remain faithful to the electoral program, but we remind him that this very program includes a range of promises that provoke laughter, such as those about "wages at an average European rate."

Following from the above conclusion, the government truly "forgets" to give, but in no way "forgets" to take. It and the PD leadership as a whole (not excluding the president) long ago reached the conclusion that the peasantry are rich enough by now, as shown by the "fact" that agricultural production has risen by 11 percent in 1993 compared with 1992 (earlier they said it had risen by 21 percent), and will rise at even higher rates in the future. Therefore, "in order to create financial reserves, agricultural earnings will be taxed from 1994...." Put in plainer Albanian, this means that from next year peasants will be taxed for their agricultural and livestock production, their cows, sheep, and goats. Now nothing remains but to see how high the "fine" will be.

However, there is no stopping at this; "A very simple tax on real estate will also be imposed." Thus, a new tax will be imposed on one's house or newly privatized apartment. The rumors of some newspapers are coming true, and it seems that we will have to buy our apartments every 10 years. The government wants to fill the budget from domestic financial resources and wants to achieve zero percent inflation by imposing taxes and increasingly reducing real wages. Will that be enough to put a stop to daily price rises? It is also gaining experience in the fiscal field, and thus finds a way of making taxes as "simple" as possible. It cannot accept the slogan of "a poor state with rich citizens," which the PD's leaders have repeated time and again.

By reading the prime minister's speech, one can soon arrive at a different conclusion: For the next three years, Albania's economic development will still be virtually at zero level. More precisely, GNP will rise at a rate of about 4 percent a year, i.e. very little more than the rate of population growth. At this rate, one cannot even think of reaching the level of 1989 by 1996, as Mr. Ruli stated to parliament. For this, we will have to wait another 10 years beyond 1996.

However, what makes this "objective" even more uncertain is Mr. Prime Minister's sincere admission that, "It is very difficult to make predictions in today's very changeable conditions." This does not require any comment. Now that almost all the scientific and research institutes have been destroyed, nobody is in any position to recommend what to do in the future. Of course, when Albanian specialists are not in this position, it will be very difficult for experts from the IMF, the World Bank, and other international organizations. At present, Albania has no interministerial group or organization (if possible nonparty) to direct the economic reform. As long as such a thing is lacking, direction is carried out at various levels of the state administration.

What oil production will be achieved? Nobody knows, but a highly optimistic footnote states that annual production has not stabilized at 600,000 tonnes, thus confirming what we said a long time ago, that its level have fallen to that of the "free flow" of the 1950s.

The same goes for the chrome, copper, coal industries, etc. However, this chapter requires a special analysis.

In conclusion, we might say that this "program" is simply a framework of guidelines that could very well have been assembled 500 days ago.

Foreign Minister Reports on Brussels Talks

AU2309182393 Sofia BTA in English 1715 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 23 (BTA) - at a press conference today, Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov briefed reporters on his participation in the political consultations at the foreign minister level between the EC Presidency and the six EC associate members which took place on September 21 and 22 in Brussels.

"We raised the issue of the entry into force of the temporary agreement on trade between Bulgaria and the EC, stressing the political importance of such a step, as Bulgaria has effectively found itself in a discriminated position," said Mr. Daskalov. Despite some positive developments, he was uncertain as to the creation of conditions for a compromise, which would allow the Council of Ministers on October 4 to make a positive decision on the agreement's entry into force.

Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, Mr. Daskalov delivered a message from President Zhelev, welcoming the discussion on a probable expansion of NATO to admit new members. "We stressed that if such a decision is made, Bulgaria sees herself as a candidate for full membership in time," the minister said.

The Bulgarian delegation to the forthcoming Council of Europe summit in Vienna will be led by President Zhelev, he said. Bulgaria will next year preside over the Committee of Ministers and it will be very important for us to take a more active part in this session, he said.

The Bulgarian delegation will follow the government-approved guidelines, the minister said in connection with the 48th session of the UN General Assembly. "We shall seek a re-affirmation of multilateral diplomacy, of the UN role in international affairs, of cooperation in the human rights field, disarmament and peacekeeping operations," he said. The Bulgarian delegation attaches a special importance to the discussion on former Yugoslavia and the sanctions issue. It will raise the issue of the establishment of a mechanism of compensating countries which strictly observe the embargo, Mr. Daskalov said.

Defense Ministry Announces Accords With Germany

AU2309164293 Sofia BTA in English 1430 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 23 (BTA)—Germany will render assistance to Bulgaria in working out methods to train small specialized units, senior officers, and help the latter enroll in German military academies, officials told a briefing at the Defence Ministry. The agreements were reached during the visit to Germany by Defence Minister Valentin Aleksandrov which ended yesterday. The leaders of the German Armed Forces expressed willingness to send military lecturers to Bulgaria.

The German defence minister is expected to visit Bulgaria in the first quarter of next year. The sides will probably sign a framework agreement on cooperation in the military field and defence. Representatives of the Bulgarian Defence Ministry also said Bulgaria would buy parts of military equipment of the army of the former East Germany, which requires a political decision by the German Government.

Foreign Ministry Views Property in Istanbul

AU2309141293 Sofia BTA in English 1205 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 23 (BTA)—In response to a request from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry for official information on the destruction of the Bulgarian school in Istanbul, the Turkish Embassy in Sofia explained that apart from its name this property has nothing to do with Bulgaria and that its ownership is of no legal value neither for Bulgaria nor for the Bulgarian community in Turkey, the press office of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry told BTA.

In this connection the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry would like to make the following statement:

"The issue of Bulgarian property and cultural and historic monuments in Turkey has invariably been on the agenda of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. This is evidenced by the protocol signed in 1966 by the then foreign ministers of the two countries Mr. Ivan Bashev and Mr. Ihsan Caglayangil; the two rounds of negotiations on this issue in 1980-1992; the political declaration of 1988; the protocol for joint actions between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries signed on March 1, 1992; and the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbour Relations, Cooperation and Security signed by the two countries on May 6, 1992.

"The Bulgarian state has spent enormous funds for the maintenance and functioning of this property.

"In response to the strong reaction of the Bulgarian public to the liquidation of the Bulgarian Evlogi Georgiev Hospital in Istanbul in 1988 and on the insistence of the Bulgarian side at the highest political level, the Turkish leadership undertook to seek a positive solution to the issue of the Bulgarian cultural and historical monuments. It also confirmed the bilateral agreement in principle for starting negotiations on reciprocal property and financial claims, including the issue of the property of the exarchate acquired through donations of all Bulgarians and of all-national importance.

"The destruction of the Bulgarian school has given rise to fears that the Turkish authorities will continue the course of complete liquidation of Bulgarian property and monuments on Turkish territory.

"Apart from its legal and political aspects, the issue of the preservation and maintenance of the Bulgarian cultural and historical heritage in Turkey is also of moral

significance and its solution will be an important test to Bulgarian-Turkish relations.

"With their activities in this case the Turkish authorities violate the spirit and content of the European Cultural Convention and the Krakow document on the preservation of cultural heritage adopted within the framework of the CSCE.

"The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry believes that the problem can be solved through negotiations in the spirit of good will, mutual confidence and cooperation," the press office of the Foreign Ministry announced.

Government Sanctions Committee Reports Losses

AU2109185193 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] The Republic of Bulgaria is rigorously applying the UN trade and economic sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Up to 20 September, not a single instance of violation has been established. All the doubts and accusations that have appeared have been checked and refuted. This is stated in a report approved by the Government Commission on the UN Sanctions.

At its meeting today, the commission approved and accepted a complete assessment of the direct, indirect, and additional losses incurred by the Republic of Bulgaria, which in the period from July 1992 to August 1993 amount to $2,271 million. This represents the total amount of the losses declared by 1,200 Bulgarian state-owned, private, and cooperative companies.

On this basis, Bulgarian Government and nongovernmental organizations will seek substantial international help for the financing facilities and projects on favorable terms.

The commission approved a Ministry of Transport report on seven projects that are ready in the national transport infrastructure, which need finance amounting to $3,435 million. Reliance is being placed on Bulgarian and foreign companies to provide this investment.

The government commission approved a proposal to provide aid to the Bulgarian population in the FRY. Bulgaria will seek permission as a matter of priority to make humanitarian deliveries to these regions.

This has been a report by Kalina Stancheva.

Dimitrov's Activities in United States Reported

AU2409091093 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 20 Sep 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Filip Dimitrov's Meetings in the United States"]

[Text] Boston (DEMOKRATSIYA report)—The visit of Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council, to the United States, continues. After attending the international meeting of participants in the fund raising organization "The U.S. President's Breakfast Prayer Group" held in Maryland, and talks in Washington with senators from Minnesota and Ohio, and congressmen from Virginia, New Hampshire, California, Ohio, and Missouri, Mr. Dimitrov arrived in Boston, where he is expected to meet professors, students, and political figures, as well as to give a lecture at Harvard University.

By the end of the week, Filip Dimitrov is scheduled to attend a youth forum dedicated to moral standards in politics, organized by the vice president and U.S. congressmen.

Commentary on Podkrepa Labor Confederation, DPS Alliance

AU2409075393 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 17 Sep 93 p 1

[Commentary by Neven Kopandanova and Kalin Manolov: "Has a Rights and Freedoms Movement-Podkrepa Emerged?"]

[Text] A confidential meeting, held in a rather crowded place, namely the parliament building, so as to be noticed, presumably marked the conclusive stage of the initiated rapprochement between the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] and the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, after the party and the trade union organization in question independently, but simultaneously, separated themselves from the Union of Democratic Forces. What the two leaders, Ahmed Dogan and Konstantin Trenchev, said to each other in private will certainly never be revealed to third persons, but the good doctor [Trenchev] admitted that their cooperation would be quite close in the future. The primary concern of the former pathologist [Trenchev] will be to see to it that the other parliamentary groups should not erect the 8 percent barrier for parties to be represented in the next parliament, because such an act would mean the end of ethnic peace in the country, according to him. Trenchev is convinced that the "whole gang" (meaning the present National Assembly deputies) should be thrown out onto the dung heap of history. He did not explain whether this applied to the time before or after the introduction of the 8 percent limit.

One thing is absolutely certain; that the new alliance smells strongly of the forthcoming elections. Nevertheless, the present government should remain in power while the DPS and Podkrepa are preparing for the elections. For the time being, they are rehearsing their scenario, the Rhodope tobacco growers strike being their first joint action. Hardly anyone could believe that the strike is as spontaneous as it appears. Without underestimating, or neglecting, the importance of the tobacco producers demands, we could, nevertheless, raise some urgent questions, for example: How did the DPS, as a ruling political force, which is responsible for the present

cabinet formed under its mandate, not manage to prevent the strike? Why did the DPS, after December 1992, lose interest in the tobacco bill, and instead of passing it at the second reading, relegated the bill to its initial position? The DPS, as a political force that throughout the current parliament session has always backed the majority, has never concealed its skill in holding many of the levers of this country's administration. How did it happen, under such circumstances, that the DPS voters, precisely, should be the economically most underdeveloped social group?

The strike will certainly be successful thanks to the joint efforts of the DPS and the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, and the victory will be defined as a guarantee of future successes. The DPS will, once again, delude its electorate that it has no greater concern than working for their welfare. Podkrepa will, once again, deceive the nation by pretending to have the support of "its own electorate." Dogan is likely to obtain several million leva from Turkey, while Trenchev will bring back some money from the United States. Thus, both will hardly need to win any seats in the next parliament, because they will be able to buy their own lobby with their millions.

EC Experts Discuss Foot-and-Mouth Disease

AU2309063193 Sofia BTA in English 1919 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Burgas, September 22 (BTA)—Representatives of the Commission of the European Community and their Bulgarian colleagues of the National Veterinary Service discussed in Burgas today a concept for establishing an anti-foot-and-mouth [anti-FMD] disease zone. Bulgaria presented a report in Brussels asking the EC for help in the building of an anti-FMD buffer zone along the Bulgarian-Turkish border. The Bulgarian representatives at today's session stressed that Bulgaria will protect entire Western Europe from the spread of epidemics and therefore the expenditures on building the zone should be shouldered by the EC.

The EC commission has proposed two strategies for an anti-FMD belt. The first envisages constant immunological control without using vaccines. The introduction of mandatory anti-FMD vaccination in all EC-member states would cost the EC about 100 million British pounds a year.

Next week representatives of the commission will visit Turkey to acquaint themselves with the actual chances of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. In late November at its session in Brussels the commission would announce what strategy it will adopt for establishing a buffer zone in Bulgaria.

Army Takes Measures Due to Russian Situation

LD2309152993 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] In view of the situation in Russia, certain measures have been carried out in the Czech Army.

Jiri Nekvasil, chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic, has ordered the intensification of military intelligence, and, above all, of radio intelligence .

So far, at a news conference today, he refused to comment on other measures. Asked how he assessed the latest events in Russia, Jiri Nekvasil said that his views are on the pessimistic side.

Klaus Comments on Russian, Polish Situations

LD2309165593 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has drawn attention to the fact that the latest political events, that is parliamentary elections in Poland, and the situation in the Russian Federation represent a certain reminder for us. Zuzana Bancanska reports:

[Bancanska] As to the results of the parliamentary elections in Poland, Vaclav Klaus, the chairman of the Civic Democratic Party, noted again:

[Begin Klaus recording] I think that the right-wing conservative party which, particularly in Poland, had a chance to develop, has failed, and I think that the elections turned out simply the way they did [as heard]. It is a reminder for us, but we do not feel that we should change fundamentally anything in our policy and behavior. [end recording]

[Bancanska] According to the words of Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the events in Russia are one of the episodes of the crystallization of the political climate of that country.

[Begin Klaus recording] As to developments in Russia, the elementary rise of basic political structures has not happened yet, and the situation, which is unfolding there, is a direct and clear consequence of this. We do not expect any exceptional dramatization of this situation. [end recording]

Discusses Reform Process

AU2209141793 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 20 Sep 93 p 18

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Karl-Peter Schwarz; place and date not given: "'We Czechs Must Achieve the Change by Ourselves'"]

[Text] [Schwarz] A small economic miracle seems to be occurring in the Czech Republic. Output is falling, but foreign currency reserves are high, there is almost full employment, and inflation is low. Those things somehow do not go together.

[Klaus] It is not an economic miracle. We have got problems with statistical data. According to the latest analyses from the Czech National Bank, the growth rate for the first six months was over 1 percent. On the other hand, the Central Statistical Agency reports that there was a decline of 1 percent over the same period. One can assume that we had a very low level of growth over the period in question.

[Schwarz] One can explain the low level of unemployment in various ways: The rapid growth in the private sector, including the shadow economy, but also the very slow pace at which the restructuring of enterprises is proceeding.

[Klaus] There is another factor that one must consider: The level of persons in employment in relation to the population as a whole. In what was formerly Czechoslovakia, the employment level was probably the highest anywhere in the world. In those days, all of us had to be in employment, all women, all young people, and all old people. Following the Velvet Revolution, employment fell to a rational level. That is why the unemployment level has remained the same although the number of persons in employment has declined. Under these conditions, output can fall without there being an increase in unemployment. This is, of course, a process that must end some day. I expect unemployment to rise in the future. Wages are rising far too quickly.

[Schwarz] Compared to the new German laender, institutional change in the Czech republic has assumed a far less dramatic form so far. In the speech that you delivered on the occasion of receiving the Ludwig Erhard prize, you made some critical remarks regarding the new laender. You spoke of the negative effects of the extensive transfer of capital from west to east and of "the crippling consequences of a transformation of society organized from outside."

[Klaus] I am not, of course, an expert on the problems connected with the changeover in eastern Germany. The difference between the situation in Germany and in our country is principally that we have to effect the changeover by ourselves. We are not receiving transfers of capital of the order of hundreds of billions of German marks.

As Far As I Am Concerned There Is No End to History

However, there is also an important psychological factor at play: We know that we cannot expect any assistance from outside. So, our motivation is greater than in the former GDR.

[Schwarz] If you were to assess the state of the reforms in the terms of a clock face, where would the hands be, at three o'clock, at six o'clock, or are they already just before twelve?

[Klaus] One must distinguish between reform measures that change the system and the effects of reforms. There is a delay between the implementation of measures and their effects. If someone fails to take that into consideration, then he does not know what is happening in our country. To return to your image: In terms of institutional transformations, we have already undoubtedly reached the evening hours, but if we look at the way in which our economy is actually functioning, then it is probably just before lunchtime.

[Schwarz] The Czech Republic's admission to the European Community primarily depends on how quickly the economy stabilizes.

[Klaus] If we are talking about the transformation of society, then the consequences of that are our main concern, the foreign policy dimension is of secondary importance in this respect. We must quite simply achieve this transformation, irrespective of whether we join the European Community tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. We are not doing this for the European Community, but for ourselves. Then we will see if Western European countries are ready to accept us.

[Schwarz] The Czech Republic has announced its intention of wishing to join the European Community at a time when there is a crisis atmosphere in the European Community. Yesterday there was talk of currency union and today it is just about possible to maintain the currency system in a makeshift way.

[Klaus] For me, there is no end of history in the way that Mr. Fukuyama prophesied. The ideas that the current situation in the European Community reflects were the ideas of yesterday, or the day before yesterday, and sometimes their origin is even much older. These ideas are changing for various reasons, are doing so independently and on the basis of new experiences. In light of both these considerations, it is clear to me that the European Community idea is undergoing an evolution. It lies in our interest to take part in this evolution from within and to participate in shaping it. Our voice is, of course, weak; it is the voice of 10 million Czech Europeans.

Integration Must Grow From Below

[Schwarz] The Czech Republic's successes have aroused suspicion in Central Europe. To put it simply, the accusation is as follows: The Czechs have broken with the Slovaks and thrown themselves into the Germans' arms so that they can join the European Community sooner. They do not want to hear anything about Central Europe solidarity. That is the accusation that one hears in Poland, in Hungary, in Slovakia, and even in Austria.

[Klaus] I am pleased that you have formulated the question so simply, if not somewhat unusually. We have no such egoistical motives. We only know that we have to become a normal European country as quickly as possible. Thus, I am not saying anything about Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, or Austria. I have neither said or done anything directed against other Central European countries. The accusations are unnecessary.

[Schwarz] What lies at the root of those accusations is a concept of the economic, cultural, and geopolitical unity of Central Europe. What does Central Europe mean to you?

[Klaus] I am opposed to all artificial attempts at integration that seek to develop new structures in Central Europe. Integration must grow from below and cannot be imposed from above. I am skeptical of analyses of the current situation in Central Europe. However, that does not say anything about feelings or thoughts, in that respect I am a true Central European. I recently attended a meeting of the Central European Initiative in Budapest. There I said that I was ready to invest in the initiative, but no one responded to that. Unfortunately, it is the case that countries that are so willing to talk about the Central European Initiative often do not want to know anything about real initiatives.

[Schwarz] In terms of security policy, the situation in the area that one previously called "Middle Europe" is still unstable. The hope that it would be possible to develop security structures within the CSCE framework has dissolved into nothing. NATO is hesitant about brining the Central European countries into its structures. The United States is withdrawing from Europe and Germany's political weight as a regional power is growing.

[Klaus] But I also see that as being the reality. However, I do not see any elements suggesting the absence of security or stability in that. A view held in some quarters is that only institutionalization can ensure security and stability. I cannot share that view of the world and of history. On the contrary, I think it is normal that there are no European institutions that intervene do direct and regulate. There is no need to force oneself to create such institutions as quickly as possible. It is like the system of fixed or flexible exchange rates. After the Bretton Woods era, everyone complained about there being no system. However, flexible exchange rates also constitute a system, but one without leading institutions and a leading bureaucracy.

This State Is Seeking Its Identity

[Schwarz] Does that mean that you do not consider the threats to Europe security to be as great as they are often thought to be? Do you think that in spite of the situation in Yugoslavia and on the territory of the former Soviet Union?

[Klaus] I do not think that a European institution could have prevented the situation in Yugoslavia or that it could have solved it. That is always what statists think.

The statists believe that if one has an idea then one needs an institution to implement it, but that is fortunately not the case. People talk of a security vacuum, but I am not sure whether that really is the case. If there are no institutions, then that in no way means that there is a vacuum.

[Schwarz] One of the pillars of Czech foreign policy are good relations with Germany. That is an new element in the history of your country. However, there is resistance to that. Before the war, Czechoslovakia sought an anchor for its security policy west of the Rhine. Those ideas still seem to be in circulation. The philosopher Vaclav Belohradsky called united Germany the main problem of the postcommunist era.

[Klaus] I do not think that Belohradsky represents Czech society. For me, the mountains of the High Tatras were as much home as the Bohemian Forest, and the Riesengebirge. My homeland has become smaller now. That is also what gives rise to a search for identity.

[Schwarz] Will there now be a new evaluation or revision of over 70 years of Czech national history.

[Klaus] This process applies to a period that is longer than the 40 years of communism; it goes back to 1918. We have recently been considering how we should celebrate the national day on 28 October, the anniversary of the foundation of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Can one simply identify Czech statehood with Czechoslovak statehood? That would, of course, be very simple. But is that really so.

[Schwarz] You were four years old in 1945, so one can hardly assume that you personally remember the end of the war and the expulsion of the Germans. It was a taboo subject for 40 years and now it has appeared once again. When did you first consider the question of the resettlement or expulsion?

[Klaus] I am not familiar with the German terminology. Do you call it resettlement or expulsion?

[Schwarz] Expulsion, "Vyhnani" in Czech.

I would not go so far as to say that it was a taboo subject. I did not know about it for a long time. I first learned of it personally in 1968. Of course, it depends on where one grew up. I have lived in Prague all my life, my parents and my neighbors did not experience the expulsion.

Incidentally, it was similar to the situation under the Soviet Army occupation after 1968. There were no Russian soldiers stationed in Prague and in the southern Bohemian town of Tabor, where we had our holiday home. For someone who lived in the north, in Mlada Boleslav, for example, the situation was different, for him the occupation was a daily experience. So I first learned of the expulsion of the Germans, which we called "deportation" in 1968 and I have to say that in those years I did not particularly occupy myself with that issue. Completely different problems were the main concern for me and my friends. Following the Velvet Revolution, we were posed the question once again.

[Schwarz] You proposed the commencement not of negotiations, but of a dialogue with representatives of the Sudeten Germans. Representatives of parties in the coalition were to take part on the Czech side. Three weeks later, you shelved the proposal once again. How do things look now?

[Klaus] I have no need to speed things up. I think that it is now time for the other side to make a move.

[Schwarz] Do you expect the Sudeten Germans to make a proposal?

[Klaus] Not the Sudeten Germans, because I am not speaking to them officially. The Sudeten Germans are not the reason why the dialogue has been shelved.

[Schwarz] But what about the Bavarian Minister President Edmund Stoiber?

[Klaus] Yes, the Bavarian Minister Stoiber. It is up to him to adopt a different approach. For me, the minister president is more than Sudeten German organizations, and without his speech and those of his colleagues, we would have made quite a bit of progress by now. He gave a signal that I could not accept. He linked the question of the Sudeten Germans, which he still considers open, with the construction of the Ingolstadt pipeline. That is something I find really unbelievable.

[Schwarz] There are several levels in Czech-German contacts: state relations with Bonn, relations with Bavaria, regional cooperation, and finally, the special level of Czech-Sudeten German dialogue. Do you not think that a special approach would be necessary?

[Klaus] First, there are not just relations between Prague and Bonn and Prague and Munich. There are also relations between Prague and Dresden. Bayern is not only our immediate neighbor, so is Saxony. I frequently visit Minister President Biedenkopf in Dresden. Of course, I also accept a dialogue between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans. I consider such a dialogue possible, but only on a suitable level, but the minister president level is certainly not suitable and an appropriate forum has to be created.

It is difficult for us to find an appropriate forum. In the end, we do not have an "anti-Sudeten German" organization that could sit down at one table with the Sudeten German organization. So, who should represent the Czech side? Not the top level of the coalition parties or other parties, but the level below that would be a possible idea. One will be to tell whether that is viable in due course.

There Should Be No More Special Rights

[Schwarz] But no Czech commission will be formed for the time being?

[Klaus] Not for the time being. If we are to talk about relations between the Germans and the Czechs. I can only find something that would apply specifically to the Sudeten Germans with difficulty. For us, the Sudeten Germans are German citizens. I know that a Sudeten German living in Germany cannot share my point of

view, I understand that very well. However, there have to be two partners for a dialogue.

[Schwarz] If the Czech Republic joins the European Community, that will mean that everyone may settle where he or she pleases....

[Klaus] For everyone, for the Italians, the Swedes, and also for the Germans, irrespective of where they come from, and that includes the Sudeten Germans.

[Schwarz] But you will surely concede in terms of a sense of belonging, there is a difference between a Neapolitan and a German who grew up in Aussig.

[Klaus] I am not sure whether someone who grew up here is really interested in returning after so many years. I really do not think so. There are also no opinion polls that would indicate that.

[Schwarz] There is a fundamental problem hidden behind the complexity of the Sudeten German question, namely, that of the recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities in Europe.

[Klaus] There are two constants for me: On the one hand, civil rights, and on the other hand, the principle of the inviolability of European borders. I am not convinced that one can introduce a third principle without jeopardizing the foundations of peace and stability in Europe. That is not obvious to me, it has to be sought out first.

[Schwarz] But borders were also altered through the division of Czechoslovakia....

[Klaus] No, that is completely wrong. That is a view that is often advanced with ill-meaning undertones. It did not involve altering borders, but involved the separation of two republics along a border that was never called into question. The Slovak question had noting at all to do with minorities. Within the framework of the joint state, Slovakia was a republic with a government, parliament, minister president, and supreme court. The situation is different from that of our Polish minority in the border area. Slovakia's position within the framework of Czechoslovakia also cannot be compared with that of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. If civil rights are guaranteed, and those include the right of ethnic groups to organize and express themselves in accordance with their language and culture, I do not see why special rights that go beyond that should be demanded by virtue of membership of a national group.

Havel Opens Central European Justice Forum

AU2209202893 Prague CTK in English 1124 GMT 20 Sep 93

[Text] Kromeriz, South Moravia Sep 20 (CTK)—The Central European Justice Forum, the first of its kind in Europe, opened in Kromeriz today.

Over 150 eminent lawyers and judges from seven Central European countries are meeting for three days to discuss both current general legal issues and the legal problems which they must solve together in the process of European integration.

Czech Minister of Justice Jiri Novak welcomed justice ministers from Austria, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.

The forum was opened with a speech by Czech President Vaclav Havel, in which he expressed a desire for a Central European information centre.

He envisaged the centre as collecting together not only the laws of the seven countries represented at the forum, but of all the European Community countries. Gradually, he said, an international information system would be built which would enable all those interested to familiarize themselves quickly with the legislation of various countries. If this becomes reality, it would be another specific and thoroughly practical contribution towards regional Central European cooperation, which is... not only in the interest of those countries here present, but in the intrinsic interest of the whole of Europe, Havel said.

Havel also assessed the importance of Central Europe to European security, as an area lying on the border of Western Europe and the traditionally unquiet European south. It was also on the border with the great civilisations of the Eurasian east. Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia were countries with a common geographical position, and as a result formed one interdependent band whose stability and security is and has to be in the immediate and essential interest of Western Europe and all its integrating structures, including security ones, Havel continued.

He added that it was in the common interest of the area to maintain good relations with Germany, a European power which was destined by its geographical position in the continent to be a mediator—and this also in its own interest—of the rapprochement of the Central European countries towards those of Western Europe.

Havel pointed to the necessary existence of a moral order from which he believed laws issue. He said that the moral order strengthened the will to uphold the legal order, to respect it and respect those who are chosen to judge in accordance with it. The judge should not, he said, be a mere technical machine for the appliance of the law, but someone who by the use of reason, adopts the law and its spirit, and who perceives its sense and knows how to interpret it.

Industry Minister Dlouhy on Foreign Investments

AU2409115393 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Sep 93 p 6

[Article by Industry and Trade Minister Dlouhy: "Foreign Investments—How Well Are We Doing"]

[Text] During the first half of this year, the total volume of direct foreign investments in the Czech Republic

reached $392 million, which is only $13 million less than over the same period last year. A substantial part of this year's sum consists, however, of payments made by the U.S. firm Philip Morris in the purchase of Tabak Kutna Hora.

Drawn this way—although it must be noted that far-reaching conclusions cannot be made on the basis of just six months—the picture does not evoke much optimism Nevertheless, certain tendencies can be detected.

The continuing recession in Western Europe and North America limits and delays the development plans of the firms that would invest more vigorously if the times were better. The decision of the Volkswagen concern to significantly cut its investment intentions for the coming years, which cannot but affect the Skoda Co., is just another example of this. It also is necessary to realize that our closest rich neighbor, Germany, reduced its 1993 investment activities by 10 percent. This development also cannot but affect us. At the same time, there are ever more countries that literally lure affluent businessmen with their capital and technology. In addition to the states that spring to every mind, we must not forget the grand privatization projects planned in Brazil and France.

We must be aware of the external influences, although we can hardly change them. We can only change the situation at home—to be more precise, some aspects of it.

Perhaps the strongest incentive bringing foreign capital to the Czech Republic is the quality and—at the same time—low cost of our work force. But! The nominal wages rose by 22 to 25 percent on average in the first half of 1993. Moreover, the prices of raw and other materials, power, transport, and services continue to grow. The real estate is overpriced, and the prevailing overemployment cannot attract anyone. The tangle of mutual indebtedness, viewed from without, immediately brings up the question of when will the scene finally clear up completely and become transparent, when will all those complex specific features, which foreigners cannot comprehend, disappear from the business—actually the foreigners do not want to understand them, and why should they if they can go elsewhere?

However orderly was the transformation from a single state (and market) into two, the partition of Czechoslovakia was hardly an incentive to invest either side of the border.

A problem that still obstructs the flow of foreign capital is the arduous, complex process of the decision-making and authorization on our side. At this very time, only on the Prague territory, there are 20 projects caught up somewhere in the administration network that represent $540 million.

Since 1990, the value of foreign investments in the Czech Republic has maintained within the interval of $100-140 million per quarter. The major shifts can be attributed to the "blows" of the Volkswagen or Philip Morris type. Nevertheless, the potential for them will soon be depleted—first, we do not have so many suitable enterprises, and, above all, we can already see the situation looming on the horizon when we will have nothing to offer the investors in the framework of privatization. The actual privatization will soon be over.

This should not, and must not, mean the end of the flow of foreign investments into the country, but rather a shift to another canal—the standard capital market. If, for the moment, I leave out the foundation of new companies "on the grassland" [starting from scratch], the investor—expressed in plain terms—instead of buying enterprises or their parts from the state in the framework of privatization, will go the stock market and buy shares.

So far, this type of investors has it difficult in the Czech Republic: The information he can obtain at the Prague Securities Exchange or from the RM-System is, by both extent and structure (i.e., also the reliability), a far cry from what he is used to from the stabilized capital markets. The sooner we will stop just talking about how significant value-generating [hodnototvorny] factor information is in today's world, and will act according to this thesis in our everyday work, the greater is the chance that, in the queue for progress, we will stand in the front and that we will not end up with just left-over crumbs. So far, unfortunately, we have been even criticized for not being able to advertise public tenders properly....

Ruml's Report Outlines Rising Crime Figures

AU2309161393 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Sep 93 p 1

[Report by "(li)": "The Crime Rate Is Continuously Rising"]

[Text] Prague—The crime rate is continuously rising in the Czech Republic. Even if the police manage to solve more and more criminal cases, the increase in the crime rate is so great that the percentage of solved crimes is constantly decreasing, because of the growth in the total number. This is what Interior Minister Jan Ruml said yesterday in parliament in his report on the security situation in the republic.

In the first half of 1993, 62,000 crimes out of 200,000 were cleared up. In the same period in 1991, 50,000 offenders were caught, while the total number of crimes was 141,000. In 23 percent of this year's cases, the offenders were children or young people, which is 11 percent more than last year.

In the first seven months of 1993, the number of economic crimes increased by 67 percent. Despite the fact that this type of crime represents less than 5 percent of the total, damage caused by this accounts for 30 percent of all the damage caused by crime.

The number of thefts of motor vehicles increased by 28 percent over last year. In 1992, the number of such thefts had almost doubled.

Since 1988, the overall damage cause by crime increased by 1,400 percent. If the current trend continues, the damage caused will reach 10 billion korunas in the first eight months of next year.

According to Ruml's report, from January to the end of July, 229 kg of Semtex, 12.5 kg of heroin, and 8.7 kg of cocaine were seized in the Czech Republic.

Filkus Considers Recall Act of 'Political Vengeance'

AU2309104193 Prague CTK in English 1450 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Vienna Sep 21 (CTK)—The latest edition of the Austrian weekly DIE FURCHE carries an interview with Rudolf Filkus, the former first Slovak ambassador to Austria.

Filkus, who stepped down recently under pressure from Bratislava, rejects a rebuke from Meciar's government that he was disloyal. On the contrary, Filkus blames Meciar for being disloyal to Slovak President Michal Kovac and the Council of Europe (CE).

After his failure to push through nationalism in the wake of Slovak independence, Filkus says, Meciar now rides the crest of a wave of populist feeling against minorities such as Romanies. Filkus sees this to be a signal that Meciar is planning early elections.

Filkus believes he was accused of disloyalty because of his remarks which had appeared in the Slovak dailies NARODNA OBRODA and PRAVDA, he says. In them, he tried to warn the Slovak cabinet that Austrian politicians, who backed Slovakia's admittance into the CE, were beginning to question Slovakia's commitment.

Meciar then put forward a proposal to the government that Filkus be immediately recalled from his post in disregard of the fact that only the president has the right to appoint and recall ambassadors.

Filkus, a cofounder of the Movement For a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), considers these steps to be political vengeance. He explains that he stepped down in order that the strained relations between Meciar and Kovac did not deteriorate further.

Our leading politicians keep saying that we have to do what is good for Slovakia. They themselves, however, only do things which turn out to be anti-Slovak, and this is hurting me, DIE FURCHE quotes Filkus as saying.

Meciar as a rule does all the work himself and distrusts others. He lacks a policy, and is even unable to put up with factual criticism. He may be a good politician, but he is not a statesman, Filkus says in DIE FURCHE.

Commentary Assesses Polish Election Results

AU2309151593 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 21 Sep 93 p 6

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "Polish Elections—A Memento"]

[Text] The election victory of the post-communist left in Poland has made our exceptional position in the Central European space even more significant. The Czech Republic is the only country of the former Soviet block in which the rightist political group, having a stable majority in parliament, is in power.

The election loss of the Prime Minister Suchocka will certainly make our government politicians sad, particularly the prime minister, who has not hesitated to make gallant gestures toward "The Thatcher of the East" recently. On the other hand, our opposition will certainly try to interpret the results of the Polish elections as proof of the fact that the concept of a radical economic reform, proposed by Leszek Balcerowicz in Warsaw and Vaclav Klaus in Prague, cannot be implemented and is doomed to fail, sooner or later.

One of the main reasons for today's victory of the post-communists in Poland stems from the fact that Balcerowicz, a strict economist, has never tried to gain political support for his bold project. The result was Balcerowicz's fall and the slowdown and dilution of his reform. On the contrary, Vaclav Klaus came quickly to the understanding that, without his own political party, he would have no chance under the conditions of the Civic Forum's [movement that was established after the fall of communism] vast political spectrum. Precisely, the establishment of a strong Civic Democratic Party that managed to attract a sufficient number of voters made the rapid implementation of Klaus' political reform possible in its fullness, which is the first prerequisite for success.

No matter how better our situation is from the viewpoint of the progress of reform, there is one important warning coming from the north: The turn to the left in Poland has not been caused by the fact that the post-communists would have offered a real alternative to the government policy. The government parties lost their supporters because of their own fault, and as a consequence of their irresponsibility and disputes, by which a large part of the public became disgusted.

From this point of view, the declarations by Vaclav Klaus made for Saturday's LIDOVE NOVINY that, in our coalition, there are real differences of opinion and that the coalition's "cohesion" is not "very great" are not very encouraging. It would be better for the fate of reform and its creators, if the prime minister exaggerated in this case.

Institute Predicts No Economic Growth This Year

AU2209132793 Prague CTK in English 0933 GMT 20 Sep 93

[Text] Vienna Sep 20 (CTK)—The Czech economy will not grow this year, but rather a one or two percent drop is expected. This was stated in a report put out by the Vienna-based Institute for Comparative Economic Study, the REUTER press agency reported today.

The unemployment rate should slightly increase from the 2.6 percent recorded in June to four to five percent by the end of the year. The reason is that industry has so far not restructured significantly, despite the fact that thousands of enterprises have been privatized. It is expected that next year the gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by some two percent and there will be a higher growth of unemployment.

This year's inflation rate is expected to reach 17 to 20 percent and changes in state fiscal policy should lead to a low balance of payments deficit in the second half of the year.

The institute is not expecting any large scale changes in economic policy but expects more expansion to take place. The priorities of economic policy are directed at supporting economic growth and increasing the standard of living, the report states.

Report Shows Increase in Alien Residents

AU2209135593 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 18 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by "li": "Of All Foreigners, Poles Account for Most Crimes"]

[Excerpts] Prague—Citizens of Poland, the former Yugoslavia, Germany, and Romania account for most criminal acts committed by foreign nationals in the Czech Republic. This arises from an Interior Ministry report on the security situation.

In the first half of this year, Polish nationals committed 222 criminal acts, which was almost 20 percent of all crime committed by foreign nationals. [passage omitted]

As of 8 September 1993, a total of 105,659 foreign nationals, excluding citizens of Slovakia, were registered as permanent residents in the Czech Republic, 155 percent more than at the end of 1992.

Politicians Comment on Situation in Russia

AU2309135493 Bratislava SME in Slovak 23 Sep 93 p 2

["SME—bog, bon, TA SR"-signed report: "Slovakia Understands Yeltsin; Opinions of Our Politicians on the Situation in Russia"]

[Text] Bratislava—President of the Slovak Republic Michal Kovac was briefed on the latest developments in Russia by Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation. Michal Kovac expressed his belief that President's Yeltsin's current measures motivated by the efforts for a speedy transformation of the political and economic system will lead to a reinforcement of democracy and economic reforms. Warding off the ongoing crisis is in the interest of the population of Russia, and also in the interest of the international community.

We asked state and parliamentary political parties officials how they view the situation in Russia, also in the context of the recently signed Slovak-Russian Agreement on Military Cooperation.

Jozef Moravcik, Slovak minister of foreign affairs: The fundamental treaty with the Russian Federation has not come into effect. It must be first approved by both parliaments. The agreement is conjured so that it is applicable only under conditions of democracy. We hope that the situation in Russia will develop in such a way that we can confirm the agreement. The military political agreement is only of a technical nature and follows directly the treaty on cooperation. Slovakia is interested in the continuation of the democratization process in Russia, and we understand President Yeltsin's measures to this effect. We believe that the situation will be dealt with by peaceful means, which in turn will contribute to the reinforcement of democracy.

Ivan Laluha, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic: The formation of a plurality democratic system in the countries that rid themselves or are ridding themselves of a totalitarianism, is a complex process. For us, it means only one thing—to aim for a speedy joining of the European structures. That means not only the economic and political ones, but the military ones as well. For us, the Russian-Slovak agreement does not represent any threat to our international status.

Arpad Dukzolyomi, deputy chairman of the Coexistence movement: The developments so far indicated good prospects, but it will not be so simple. Passivity is deeply rooted in the Russian society; the Russian people needs to be led by a firm hand. I would not rule out that a harsh regime will be implemented.

Milan Knazko, chairman of the preparatory committee of the Slovak Alliance of Democrats: The situation is irksome. The chaos that arose is not being solved by democratic means. Nevertheless, I would like to express the hope that the situation will be settled without the use of force. I must point out that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supervises the outcome of the agreement with Russia on military cooperation. It is clear from the agreement that the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for its political aspects.

Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement: Slovakia has neither ways nor means to change the developments in Russia. Therefore, I believe, that the Slovak Republic should not take a definite stand on either side.

Ludovit Cernak, chairman of the Slovak National Party: I believe that Mr. Yeltsin will succeed in the difficult situation as he has done several times before. I will not comment on the Russian-Slovak agreement. The Slovak National Party has great reservations against the manner in which the military-defense document was adopted, which the Slovak Defense Ministry signed without previous consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Visiting Russian Official Critical of Khasbulatov

LD2309145493 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the foreign committee of the Russian Parliament, who has been on an official visit to Slovakia since 20 September, met journalists in Bratislava today. It is understandable that discussions should above all concern the current tense developments in Russia. The Russian representative said that the Russian people have not joined in the power struggle between the parliament and executive power. Ambartsumov was asked for his views on the deadlock in Moscow. Let us now listen to a telephone report sent to us a few minutes ago by our editor Igor Skocek.

[Skocek] The chairman of the Supreme Soviet foreign committee said that his position is somewhere in the middle. At the same time, he inclines in favor of a reform policy. He went on to stress the need for good mutual relations between Slovakia and the Russian Federation. He noted that a mutual treaty has been concluded, and said that its ratification will probably be debated in the next, differently composed Russian parliament.

He also touched on the question of the endeavor of central European countries to join NATO. According to him Russia would rather see the formation of Europe-wide structures. Of course, Slovakia, like every sovereign state, has the right to make a sovereign decision, which he fully understands. Nonetheless, if NATO shifts its sphere to the Russian borders and does not carry out a reform of its existing ideological thinking one can understand the concern of the Russian state. Independent of this he is in favor of the full intensification of mutual contacts. Joining NATO is one thing—economic cooperatoon is another.

Concluding, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov returned to the current situation in Russia. The blame for the aggravation of the situation lies to a great degree with Ruslan Khasbulatov, who has done everything pssible not to reach agreement with the president, he said. A democratic state must have its own parliament which must, however, be a democratic one, he declared.

Romanian President Begins Visit, Makes Statement

AU2309190793 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Beginning today, a Romanian delegation headed by Romania's President Ion Iliescu is paying a visit to Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia. Welcomed at Bratislava Airport by the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Moravcik, President Ion Iliescu proceeded to the presidential palace where he was welcomed by Slovak President Michal Kovac.

According to our special envoy, official talks began between the delegations led by the presidents of the two countries.

Teodor Melescanu, state minister and minister of foreign affairs, held separate talks with his Slovak counterpart, Jozef Moravcik.

The program for the first day of the visit paid by Romania's president to Bratislava included a working luncheon given by the Slovak president and a meeting with Bratislava's mayor. We received the following report by our special envoy, Sorin Croitorescu.

[Begin Croitorescu recording] After the meeting with the mayor of the Slovak capital, which took place in a museum near the town hall—a beautiful medieval building dating back to the 16th Century—President Iliescu gave a brief statement to our radio station. [end Croitorescu recording]

[Begin Iliescu recording] Our visit has begun under very favorable conditions, something we actually expected. From the very beginning of our meeting, that is during the discussions, an atmosphere of opening up, of friendship, understanding, and open dialogue prevailed. We reviewed both domestic problems—and we noted a great similarity in the problems faced by the two countries in the process of consolidating the democratic structures and in the transition to the market economy—and international issues that are of interest to us and problems we are confronting in our region. We also noted that we fully agreed on the respective issues. We emphasized the need to strengthen our cooperation, develop our relations based on common interests—we noted that there are a great number of common interests at all levels—as well as our cooperation in the international arena, as concerns our position within Europe and the world in general.

Thus, I can say that our visit started under very favorable conditions. [end recording]

Kovac Receives Delegation

LD2409094293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Report by correspondent Ivo Kunsch with remarks by Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu recorded, in English with superimposed Slovak translation]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Slovak President Michal Kovac and representatives of the city of Bratislava received today a Romanian Government delegation, which is currently in the Slovak Republic on an official visit. Romanian President Ion Iliescu put his signature in the City's Golden Book at the historical Old Town Hall.

In the delegation accompanying the Romanian president was Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Viorel Melescanu. While touring the Town Hall, Melescanu imparted some information to Ivo Kunsch:

[Kunsch] Melescanu emphasized that talks with President Kovac took place in a friendly atmosphere and that everything testifies to the fact that there is practically nothing that would hamper good relations between Slovakia and Romania. It is natural that good bilateral relations depend on many other factors, in particular on stability in the Central and East European region. What I wanted to know was in what way does Romania want to contribute to this stability, given its relations with Slovakia. Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu told me the following:.

[Melescanu] First, by maintaining good relations between our countries and by supporting the most basic values in our domestic policy and in international relations. There are many problems, including minority ones. We discussed ethnic minorities living in Slovakia and Romania. In order to solve this issue common to both republics, we reached an agreement on what the main priorities were. Our future efforts will be aimed at improving communications between the two countries on this issue. By saying this I do not wish to state that communications are not good. The example of the Slovak minority's position in Romania shows that we can attain this objective quite easily. [passage omitted]

[Kunsch] I have yet another development to report. A gala reception in honor of the Romanian Government delegation started at Bratislava Castle about an hour ago. President Kovac said, among other things, that there has never been tension in relations between Romania and Slovakia. However, these relations have not always been a result of healthy economic needs. They were often merely a result of the fact that both countries were isolated from the world economy. Nowadays the two countries are linked by common problems, problems concerning, for example, Hungary, which is a neighbor of both these countries.

The Slovak president said he himself was convinced that a model of cooperation, which will be in line with modern European tendencies, will come into being in the context of a sincere and frank dialogue.

Iliescu Toasts Kovac

AU2409061593 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 23 Sep 93

["Excerpt" of Romanian President Ion Iliescu's toast at dinner reception given in his honor by President Michal Kovac, in Bratislava on 23 September—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. President, dear Slovak friends, ladies and gentlemen: I would like to express my satisfaction with the official visit I am paying to the Slovak Republic, the first visit at this level following the establishment of the Slovak Republic as an independent entity, in accordance with international law.

Mr. President, I am certain that our meeting and the talks we have held in an open atmosphere of friendship, will contribute to the development of cooperation between Romania and the Slovak Republic and to have a better idea of our peoples' potential to accomplish certain acts of cooperation at this difficult stage of reform and transition.

We are certain that the treaty on friendship and cooperation between Romania and the Slovak Republic that we will sign tomorrow will also serve this goal.

As you very well know, in the period that has elapsed since the 1989 December revolution, profound structural and institutional changes have taken place in Romania regarding the establishment of democracy and a state of law, as well in the transition to the market economy, which are irreversible processes. The Romanian legal and governmental bodies have made consistent efforts to establish the adequate judicial framework for a state of law, so that the respect for human rights, political pluralism, free initiative, private property, and freedom of opinion can become part of everyday life. (end recording)

Toth Outlines Three Economic Starting Points

AU2309170293 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 17 Sep 93 p 4

[Interview with Finance Minister Julius Toth by Eva Salengova; place and date not given: "The Government's Three Main Starting Points"]

[Text] The economic policy of Vladimir Meciar's government is under pressure from the constant criticism being leveled at it by the Slovak opposition, which alludes in particular to the lack of a concept in the restructuring process and in the economic transformation associated with it. We spoke with Finance Minister Julius Toth on what the government considers to be its successes in its chosen course of action.

[Salengova] Mr. Minister, how do you assess the steps taken by the government so far and their results?

[Toth] In eight months of activity, the government has managed to gain the Slovak Republic's admission into almost all the international institutions with which it has concluded agreements. I personally consider the agreement with the International Monetary Fund to be the most important. We have been accepted into the Council of Europe, we have been granted membership in many world organizations, and an agreement with the European Community is in preparation.

[Salengova] Yes, these are certainly unquestionable successes, but let us take a closer look at the economy....

[Toth] The government knows that the economy is not in the kind of shape that it should be in. Nevertheless, we have to realize that it is undergoing a transformation. The sole and main common denominator of Slovakia's current economic problems is that we do not have as many markets as we require for our industrial output. So as at least to hold on to the markets that we have, the government devised a pro-export policy by introducing a new taxation system. The government has also been able to finance exports by issuing special bonds to purchase certain letters of credit through the banks. It is trying to do more to resolve the blockages in the flow of money, for example, by partially purchasing the enterprises' outstanding claims. On the other hand, it is implementing measures to make the flow of money more clear-cut, and it is trying—by legal means—to reduce secondary insolvency to a tolerable level.

[Salengova] These are all, obviously, necessary steps that—perhaps—come more under financial-economic measures. How would you respond to the opposition's criticism that the government lacks an economic policy concept?

[Toth] In my opinion, the government has an economic policy concept. It proceeds from three basic steps. First, it involves guaranteeing the Slovak koruna's internal convertibility; second, it involves maintaining the macroeconomic indicators—inflation—within the limit set by the state budget; and, third, the government is attempting to devise a pro-export policy.

[Salengova] However, the government is not succeeding in all these steps....

[Toth] The only thing in which we are not succeeding is in guaranteeing a balanced state budget as we—in view of the profound changes in the Slovak economy—had forecast. We could not know the impact of the taxation policy or the consequences of the state's breakup. But, if the government had approved a budget of minus 10 billion korunas [Sk], the current deficit would be even greater.

[Salengova] Do you think you will be able to keep it at Sk16 billion?

[Toth] We will try to do so with all the means that we have. However, this does not only depend on the Finance Ministry, but, first and foremost, on the producers and on the departments that supervise and influence them.

Upcoming U.S. Mission Seen as Crucial

AU2409075993 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 18 Sep 93 p 3

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "This Can No Longer Be Just a Coincidence; Hesitation About Slovakia's NATO Membership Is Assuming a Dangerous Dimension"]

[Text] Everyone who assumed that it was through an oversight that the German chancellor failed to mention Slovakia in connection with admission to NATO in a recent statement in Budapest was proven wrong by Wednesday's statement by German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, made in an interview for the private N-TV television channel. Ruehe said, literally, that "the integration of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary must be given priority," while "we will have to keep watching developments in Slovakia."

Let us not indulge in any illusions. In diplomatic language these words mean a serious warning, especially if they were spoken by a politician who had declared only one day earlier that he advocated the expeditious integration of the Visegrad Four [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland] countries into NATO, even prior to their admission into the European Community. The reason he gave was that zones with different security standards might otherwise evolve in this part of the continent.

The accord [of Ruehe's words] with the altered standpoint of Russian experts and generals, who openly demand that Moscow, too, become a fully fledged member of the alliance concurrently with these countries, is almost conspicuous in this context. At the same time, the cautionary hint could not have escaped our attention that Russia might resort to a combination of political and economic activity to defend its geopolitical interests on the continent. These are historically given and one cannot fail to take them into consideration.

Some spiteful people even claim that, during their meetings, Kohl and Yeltsin have demarcated their spheres of interests, with Slovakia falling into the eastern zone. Fortunately, however, in other NATO countries, the view still prevails that, for various reasons, but, in particular, to avert the possibility of a flash point of tension arising in Central Europe, all four members of the Visegrad Group should be admitted into the pact.

Of course, the dice have not yet been thrown. Very much will depend on the U.S. mission that will arrive in Bratislava next week and whose relatively high level demonstrates that, probably, this will be the moment of truth. At the same time, the mission confirms Washington's interest in acquainting itself face to face with our positions, which we have, admittedly, declared, without, however, launching a proper diplomatic offensive.

The forthcoming UN General Assembly meeting will provide an opportunity for such an offensive. During the meeting, Minister [of Foreign Affairs] Moravcik should center his attention, above all, on this literally vital issue for Slovakia and its future existence. However, at least the same degree of responsibility is expected from the entire cabinet, some members of which, by many of their statements as well as their deeds, really do not in the least enhance the credibility and legibility of Slovak policy. This applies to both the domestic and international scenes. Let us not be under any illusions—we are all under the Western world's microscope and every little word uttered and every deed accomplished are subjected to scrutiny.

Of course, much will also depend on developments in the surrounding countries. Tomorrow's elections in Poland could change the entire scenario. In Hungary, Antall's government is struggling to survive and the possibility of early elections cannot be ruled out. Only in the Czech Republic is the situation more or less stable, despite various tensions within the coalition. And as far as the Slovak political scene is concerned, I suppose that no one knows how it will evolve.

There is no need to throw in the towel yet regarding the Slovak Republic's NATO membership. However, we should not rest on our laurels either, because the number of warning signals is growing and it is high time to clear the air—outwardly as well as inwardly. Doubts about our aims would mean a defeat not only for the government team but for all of us.

Antall Letter to Yeltsin Relayed by Kozyrev

LD2309170393 Budapest MTI in English 1441 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 23 (MTI)—Hungary's Foreign Ministry on Thursday gave MTI a copy of a letter Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall sent to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, through Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, on September 20, Monday.

"I would like repeatedly to express my high esteem and appreciation for your resolute and unflagging struggle for the implementation of reforms, and the establishment and strengthening of a new, democratic Russian Federation, based on a market economy. We are convinced that your aim is a united Russian Federation, and the enforcement of a federal system of the various republics under principles of the rule of law and modern federalism. Mr President, I express my sincere good wishes to these endeavours.

"I am convinced that Russia, which has for centuries been a great power of Europe and the world, will retain this status even in the future. Just for this reason, we have a vested interest in keeping friendly and good relations between Russia and our region, including Hungary. But I also believe that, irrespective of our size, Russia shares this interest. I emphasize in all my personal statements - and so do the members of our government - the need to grant you personal support. We are convinced that there is no alternative to your policy and your rule as a statesman.

"Central and eastern Europe's revival, economic and social transformation, hand in hand with the emergence of new, independent states, brought to the surface some nationalist political trends which, elevated to state level, sparked off conflicts endangering the security of Europe as a whole. The security of Europe is one and indivisible.

"In this sense, we consider our region's gradual involvement in Euro-Atlantic integration as indispensable from political, economic, and security points of view and the aspect of balance of power in Europe.

"We underline again that we see integration as a process gradually extending from West to East. We would never support a policy against, or for isolating, Russia. This would be not only an unrealistic but even a foolish political endeavour.

"Hungary wishes to continue becoming integrated into the European Community as a full member, and promoting relations with NATO and its member states.

"On the basis of this, it seems needless to justify that this policy is not aimed against Russia but, on the contrary, forms an integral part of the policy of cooperation with a renewing Russia, carrying out its reforms successfully. I am sincerely pleased to know that you, Mr President, and the Russian reform forces feel and appreciate this - an appreciation which makes the whole of Hungary and our government deeply grateful," Antall wrote in his letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Antall Sets 1994 General Election Period

LD2409092793 Budapest MTI in English 0841 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 24 (MTI)—Disputes of constitutional and legal interpretation have recently evolved concerning the date of the 1994 general elections in Hungary.

As government spokeswoman Judit Juhasz told the press in an interval of the Thursday government session, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall had informed President Arpad Goncz in a letter on how the government interpreted the relevant regulations.

At the regular press briefing on Friday morning, state secretary at the prime minister's office Jozsef Kajdi announced that the prime minister's letter had given the period from May 3 to August 2 for the president of the republic to set the exact date of the 1994 general elections.

The mandate of the present national assembly expires on May 2, 1994. According to the constitution, general elections have to be held within 90 days after that. Up to the founding session of the new parliament, the present one remains in office.

Early this week, the national electoral committee president informed president Arpad Goncz that, according to the interpretation of the law by the committee's experts, the elections may and have to be held between May 3 and July 8, 1994.

Calling general elections is a discretionary right of the president of the republic.

Deputies View Implications of Polish Elections

AU2309170993 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 22 Sep 93 p 4

[Report by Tamasi-Papp: "Hungarian Views on Polish Elections"]

[Text] The left wing won at the Polish elections last weekend. We asked a number of politicians of the parliamentary parties: What conclusions can be drawn from this regarding the parliamentary elections in Hungary next year?

Laszlo Kover, Parliamentary Group leader of the Federation of Young Democrats: "Hungarian public opinion polls show that the left wing has a realistic chance of winning, and at the same time, there is also a chance of avoiding this because it is not fatal [word as published]. In Poland, only the left-wing bloc was united, as both the liberal and conservative forces entered the elections in a rather confused state, so a number of significant parties do not have any seats in the Polish Parliament. In my

view, in addition to this, the Polish Catholic Church also did much to push the otherwise Catholic population into the arms of the left wing. Hopefully, the church's feudalistic attitude will be a warning for Hungary and show that it is not expedient to follow this in a modern society."

Endre Pokorny, director of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's Parliamentary Group: "I have not yet had time to analyze the results of the Polish elections, and I need a few days to think things over. Otherwise, I do not at all see that the danger of returning to the old regime is looming. From the results of the Polish elections, we can only draw very indirect conclusions for ourselves."

Lajos Horvath, chairman of the Hungarian Justice Parliamentary Group: "The danger of the left wing's advancement will cease to exist when, being aware of the results of the Polish elections, the Hungarian population will soon be able to learn about the left wing's lack of success in Poland because it lacks any realistic economic basis for success. In my view, this will be a warning for Hungarian citizens that they must not vote for the left wing."

Miklos Omolnar, representative of Smallholders '36: "The events in Poland are definitely a warning. Those people who are on the other side of the political spectrum will have to think about the past three years and see if they were right in doing whatever they did, whether they used the right tone in Parliament and generally, with the whole society, in fact, if they actually managed to address society. Let us not forget, either, that the new political elite consists of beginners. In my view, the reason is political inexperience. At any rate, free elections are cruel, and all sorts of emotional factors can play a role in them."

Ivan Vitanyi, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party's Parliamentary Group: "Naturally, absolute analogies do not exist. One similarity exists, namely that four years have passed since the change of regime and the electors do not make their judgments on the basis of nostalgia and old affairs, but rather they mainly judge the various parties on the basis of their politics in the past years. I imagine that the Polish people and the Polish empire is no less Catholic now than before. If, nevertheless, they have not elected a Christian and Catholic party, the reason is not that they have turned away from Christianity, but rather that they did not see the work of the representatives of these parties as satisfactory; and if they now elected a left-wing party, it does not mean a desire to return to the Soviet system, but simply that they found it more attractive. This is definitely a warning for the Hungarian Government parties, and for the opposition, too."

Sandor Karcsay, deputy of the Christian Democratic People's Party, member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee: "My impression is that the broad spectrum of the Polish parliamentary parties anticipated that they would not be able to form an adequate legislative majority in Parliament. It also has to be remembered that the Poles were suffering even more from all the difficulties that we have also experienced since the change of regime, even though, according to the news, firm economic growth has started there. I do not think that it is very significant, but I will still mention that the last soldiers of the former Soviet Army have only just left Poland. In our circumstances, in accordance with the European social democratic structures, I would not consider it dreadful if a left-wing party appeared that tended towards social democracy. In my view, in Hungarian political life, a strong labor party, a strong Christian democratic conservative party, and a somewhat weaker liberal party should be in the leading places, and smaller fragments of right-wing and left-wing extremes could also exist. Naturally, by a social democratic party, I do not mean some kind of formation that resembles the former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, as I would also consider a return to the past economically catastrophic."

SZDSZ Chairman Views Election Prospects

AU2409075093 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Sep 93 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Ivan Peto, chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats, by Attila Zsoldos; place and date not given: "An SZDSZ-MDF Meeting Could Make Sense Soon"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Zsoldos] According to [Federation of Young Democrats Chairman] Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is the big loser in the election agreement between the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ]. Would you also stress this in analyzing the aforementioned agreement?

[Peto] The two liberal parties signed the agreement regarding their cooperation in the period before the elections and in the period between the two rounds in order to strengthen each other. They also took it upon themselves to refrain from making any election alliances with other parties, except those mentioned in the agreement. It is a fact that, because of the particularities of the Hungarian election system, this means isolation for the MSZP, because their chances of forming an election alliance with a big party in the second round are rather slim. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] The FIDESZ often attacks its political allies, the SZDSZ included. However, your answer is generally silence.

[Peto] I must say that the observations directed at us are very accidental. So far, the only genuine difference of opinion between us has been the interpretation of the foreign policy consensus. According to the FIDESZ, there is a basic consensus, but the government forgets to coordinate things sometimes; in our view, although it would be welcome, such a consensus does not exist,

because the government eliminated it with some of its measures. I repeat that this has been the only genuine difference of views between us. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] Before signing the political cooperation agreement, the SZDSZ would have liked to stipulate in writing that the two parties would only be allowed to conduct coalition negotiations together. Finally, under pressure from FIDESZ, you agreed on a solution involving less restriction. Is it possible that, of the two liberal parties that form this alliance, one could get into the government and the other remain in the opposition?

[Peto] I must correct things, because we argued about the possible guarantees at the negotiations. We agreed that it is useless to stipulate in writing something for which it is impossible to provide guarantees. I think that, if we have made a promise to the voters that we regard each other as first partners, one who disregards the votes given to the political alliance makes a big mistake. There is no more guarantee than this in this area. [passage omitted]

[Zsoldos] Given Hungary's economic situation, the politicians of various parties would like to see a grand coalition government after 1994. Do you agree with this?

[Peto] It is impossible to evaluate the post-election coalition possibilities today. There can be similar arguments in favor of a grand coalition and against it. There is no absolute truth in this field. The victory of one or the other view will depend on the election results and the desire to join the coalition.

[Zsoldos] Is it a sign from this viewpoint that, among the parliamentary parties, you have only not held talks with the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] in the past year?

[Peto] Nor have we met with any Smallholders group, for the same reasons that we have not met with the MDF. At the moment, there is great uncertainty around both parties, and one does not know which trend among the many will be the decisive one at the elections. We have hardly any contacts with the MDF as a party. I think that some people in the largest government party also feel that their current political line will not make them capable of forming a coalition after the elections, and thus, it can easily happen that an SZDSZ-MDF meeting will make sense.

[Zsoldos] Do you see any hope for change?

[Peto] The MDF policy greatly depends on it's leader. We do not know who will lead the party to the elections and we do not know whether the largest government party will genuinely change or not. In principle, nothing is excluded.

Parliament Begins To Discuss Defense Bill

AU2209201693 Budapest MTI in English 1021 GMT 21 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, 21 Sep (MTI)—The Hungarian Parliament on Tuesday [21 September] morning started discussing the defence bill and related amendments to the constitution.

Presenting the bill, Defence Minister Lajos Fur said it had been coordinated by 11 rounds of inter-party negotiations.

Respecting the constitutional principle of self-government, the bill regulates in detail the relationship between civilian and military administrations. The minister noted that Hungary, in keeping with the 1990 Paris Treaty, had decreased the staff of its army from 150,000 to below 100,000. In parallel, the army had developed a new command structure and assumed a defensive nature, changing the location of its troops considerably. Modernization of the army would take 10-15 years, the minister said.

Under the bill, women will no longer be liable for military service, while men unfit for military service will not be enlisted. Compulsory military service for men with two children will be reduced to six months and those with three children will be exempt. The length of unarmed military service will be reduced from 15 to 12 months, and that of civilian service from 22 to 18 months. Service time for reservists will be reduced from ten to four or six months. Reservists will have to be notified six months before they are actually called up.

Upon call-up, all conscripts will receive a benefit. The family allowance for conscripts will increase and pay for reservists will guarantee the livelihood of their family.

As opposition parties said their key speakers would only make contributions next week, parliament adjourned the debate.

State Electoral Committee Announces Results

WS2309141393 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by J.T.P.: "Eleven Committees Will Divide Seats; State Electoral Committee Confirms Forecast"]

[Text] **The State Electoral Commission [PKW] announced Wednesday [22 September] evening Sejm election results and listed the election committees that will participate in the distribution of seats in districts. The parties are: Democratic Left Alliance—20.41 percent; Polish Peasant Party—15.40 percent; Democratic Union—10.59 percent; Labor Union—7.28 percent; Confederation for an Independent Poland—5.77 percent; and Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms—5.41 percent.**

The seats will also be distributed among five national minority organizations, which the Electoral Law exempts from the condition of obtaining 5 percent of votes. The following organizations will have a chance to receive seats: the Social-Cultural Association of Germans of Katowice Voivodship, the Social-Cultural Association at Opole Silesia, which received 60,770 votes; the Social-Cultural Association of People of German Origin in Czestochowa Voivodship—10,164 votes; the German Commonwealth of Reconciliation and Future—13,776 votes; and the Belarusian Union, which was supported by 10,164 persons.

The remaining committees will not enter into the Sejm. "Solidarity" was the closest—it received 4.90 percent, which means that it obtained 0.1 percent less than was necessary. In other words, it needed only 14 thousand votes more to get into the Sejm. The Catholic Election Committee "Fatherland" will also not enter the Sejm—it received 6.37 percent; therefore, it did not meet the condition that the Electoral Law envisions for coalitions: it did not exceed 8 percent.

Two other parties were also close to obtaining 5 percent: the Polish Union-Center Accord—4.42 and the Liberal-Democratic Congress—3.99 percent. They were followed by: the Union for Real Politics—3.18 percent; the "X" Party—2.79 percent; the Coalition for the Republic—2.70 percent; the Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Accord—2.37 percent. The total votes came to 13,796,227.

Now, on the basis of the announcement of PKW, district committees will distribute seats on district lists. Protocols will start coming in to PKW on Thursday. On receiving all protocols, PKW will begin distributing seats on national lists. Professor Zoll said that the final announcement of the election results can be expected on Friday.

PKW will announce the Sejm's composition only after district committees have distributed seats on district lists, and PKW has distributed the remaining seats on national lists. However, even after the official results are announced, corrections will be possible: candidates who hold offices that cannot be combined with being a deputy, must give up one of the posts within seven days.

Sejm Seat Distribution

LD2309214893 Warsaw PAP in English 2131 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 23—The State Electoral Commission on Thursday evening announced official results of the elections to the Sejm (lower house) and Senate.

Results of elections to the Sejm:

	Seats
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	171
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	132
Democratic Union (UD)	74
Union of Labour	41
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)	22
Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR)	16
German Minority Organizations	4

A total of 460 deputies have been elected to the Sejm, including 69 persons who have entered the Sejm on the basis of national lists. The election turnout was 52.08 per cent with a total of 14,415,586 voters taking part in the ballot. Invalid votes accounted for 4.30 per cent. A total of 8,787 candidates have run for parliament.

A total of 100 senators have been elected. The turnout amounted to 52.06 per cent with a total of 14,408,367 voters having casted their votes in the elections to the Senate. Invalid votes accounted to 2.93 per cent.

SLD To Propose Kwasniewski for Prime Minister

AU2409094793 Warsaw PAP in English 1121 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 23—The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) will put forward its leader Aleksander Kwasniewski as candidate for prime minister if it decides to undertake a mission of forming the new government, said SLD spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski.

Siemiatkowski added that the SLD had not yet received President Walesa's letter so there was no question of a reply yet. In the letter, which was published in Poland's papers on Thursday [23 September], Walesa asks the SLD to forward three prime ministerial candidates.

Siemiatkowski said that the SLD did not want to repeat the experience of Democratic Union (UD) leader Bronislaw Geremek who was asked by President Walesa to form a government following the 1991 parliamentary elections and then failed in his efforts to do so. "We will enter the game if there is a big chance and likelihood of creating a government," the SLD spokesman explained.

He thought that the SLD would not present three candidates since this would be contrary to the interim "small" constitution, and said that the SLD had had this standpoint from the beginning.

Kwasniewski: SLD Forming Government

LD2309185593 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 23 Sep 93

[From the "Wiadomosci" newscast; relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[Text] [Announcer Malgorzata Szelewicka] In a letter to President Lech Walesa, Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], wrote that the SLD is, as the grouping that won the elections, commencing the creation of a government. Experts from the Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] stated after negotiations today, that there are no differences to be found in the economic programs of both parties that would preclude the creation of a joint government coalition. The SLD will take a decision on the possible presentation of a candidate for prime minister to the president on Monday, after a meeting of the Alliance leadership.

[Correspondent] The leaders of the Alliance feel that there is no need to present the Belweder Palace with as many as three candidates.

[Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, SLD press spokesman, identified by caption] We will present a single candidate for prime minister. This transpires in unambiguous fashion from the provisions of the Small Constitution.

[Correspondent] The experts from the SLD and the PSL met so as to compare the economic programs of both groups.

[Jozef Oleksy, SLD press spokesman, identified by caption] There is coincidence on many issues. We did not note any issues that would make it impossible to create a joint program. And so this is a very positive result from our meeting.

[Waldemar Pawlak, PSL Chairman] There were talks between experts, and it transpired that there are no such matters where there would be contradictions or problems that would be incapable of being overcome.

[Correspondent] Next week talks between experts from both sides will commence regarding particular branches of the economy.

'No Risk' of Return to Past

LD2309211993 Warsaw PAP in English 2106 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Rome, Sept. 23—There is nothing in our programme that could pose a risk of a return to the past, leader of the victorious Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) told the Italian IL SABATO Catholic weekly.

Aleksander Kwasniewski also said his alliance offered President Lech Walesa a loyal cooperation.

The top priority is to speed up economic growth which has already started largely owing to privatisation and foreign investments in Poland, Kwasniewski stated. Another important task will be to find budget means to shield the worst off segments of society. In order to achieve these goals a strong and stable government should be formed capable of surviving a full four-year term of office.

The SLD leader emphasized that the final adoption of the concordat by parliament was not an urgent matter and should until after the new Polish Constitution is adopted.

He said his alliance was strongly pro-European in outlook and would work to see Poland a full member of the EC. Good relations with the IMF and the World Bank were also high on the list of priorities of the winning coalition.

Article Profiles Kwasniewski

AU2309173193 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by Igor Janke: "Aleksander Kwasniewski"]

[Text] People say that after going on a rigorous diet, he resembles Kevin Costner ("Dances With Wolves"). Journalists wonder whether this is the result of dieting or of plastic surgery. Kwasniewski, who is already beginning to be named as the future prime minister, lost 12 kg a few weeks before the elections. Apparently, he went over to a completely vegetarian diet. He only ate vegetables and dairy products. He gave up liquor altogether. In the art of dieting, he was competing against his party colleague Jozef Oleksy, who obtained a much worse result, losing only 6 kg, and finally stopped taking his Herbalife tablets.

Aleksander Kwasniewski's political career began in the apparatus of the Association of Polish Students at Gdansk University. In 1977, he was admitted to the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. During the first four years after the introduction of martial law, he was editor in chief of the student publication ITD and was then head of SZTANDAR MLODYCH from 1984 to 1985.

In 1985, he joined the government. He was minister for youth affairs in Zbigniew Messner's cabinet. Two years later he became chairman of the Committee for Youth and Physical Culture. Following the collapse of communism, the NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] accused him of financial mismanagement on the committee. In 1988, he returned to government—this time it was to the last communist team, which was headed by Mieczyslaw Rakowski. He was chairman of the Sociopolitical Committee. He was also chairman of the Polish Olympics Committee.

As communism headed toward collapse, Kwasniewski was considered an activist in the "reformist wing" of the PZPR. At the roundtable, he was cochairman of the team dealing with trade union pluralism.

A high point for him was the last PZPR congress. He became leader of the new Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland [SdRP]. As a man of the center, he tried to bring together the conservative, apparatchik wing of the party and the young PZPR "liberals." The first was symbolized by Leszek Miller and the second by Tomasz Nalecz, who led the 8 July Movement, a PZPR reformist structure. At the congress, Kwasniewski said that he would assume the post of chairman on condition that reformers were brought into the party's ruling bodies. That is what happened.

Although Nalecz left the SdRP, the layout of forces within the party did not change. It was led by Kwasniewski, who had Leszek Miller on his left and Jozef Oleksy on his right, between whom there has been a constant tacit rivalry. Although Kwasniewski would no doubt like to get rid of the "hardliners," he realizes that those people enjoy considerable support among the electorate. The pragmatic Kwasniewski has not allowed himself to be swayed by emotions in this case, either.

He is a man of compromise. Although he is considered the unquestioned leader, he gave first place on the SLD's [Democratic Left Alliance] national list to Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz to prevent a conflict. It is known that he would have been prepared to make greater concessions to form a government along with the Democratic Union and thus shed the SdRP's image as a postcommunist party once and for all. When necessary, he convinced his party to support the government's privatization program.

He tries to be consistent in all his activities and to make maximum use of all manner of circumstances to benefit himself and his party. Aleksander Hall, who dislikes him, describes him as the kind of cynic who could have just as well made a career in a liberal party as in a postcommunist grouping that describes itself as a social democratic movement.

Kwasniewski worked hard to create a new image for the SdRP, that of a party of modern, competent, refined specialists. He likes to reply to foreign journalists questions in English or in German. He walks about with a cellular telephone and likes to play tennis in his free time. He loves appearing at informal gatherings of "Solidarity" and likes to talk about the values that he shares with, for example, Adam Michnik. He never allows himself to become euphoric, wants to present himself as someone who is responsible and sensible, and avoids aggressive attacks.

He always finds time for journalists—he and his friends were much better at dealing with the mass media than their rivals from the former opposition. Thanks to that, Western publications have begun to carry articles about a modern, European postcommunist leader.

UD Rules Out Participation in Leftist Government

AU2309165393 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Sep 93 p 1

[Report signed 'an, dom, em': "They Don't Want To, But They Must?"]

[Text] Will the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] form a government? The Democratic Union [UD] says they should now assume responsibility for governing the country.

Already during election night, the SLD considered whether someone from the UD should be prime minister. Some SLD people even said they would be prepared to see Suchocka be prime minister again as long as the UD enters into a coalition with the SLD. But this idea disappeared the following morning. "The UD only got 10 percent of the votes, so it cannot dictate terms," said a leading SLD politician.

Kwasniewski makes no secret of the fact that the SLD would like to cooperate with the UD for two reasons. First, a government involving the UD would please the West and calm the moods of the Solidarity voters. Second, the media are considered to be pro-UD, therefore a government without the UD would be subjected to endless criticism. The press would make an issue out of every single slip of paper signed by an SLD official.

"It is cowardly of the SLD to offer the UD joint responsibility for the country in a situation like this," said UD deputy chairman Wladyslaw Frasyniuk. Said Andrzej Celinski, also of the UD: "In the eyes of the voters, it is impressions that count, and UD participation in the government would be disastrous for us. After all, we still have a reputation for aspiring to power, and we cannot shake it off."

Yesterday, the UD Presidium ruled out the possibility of entering into a coalition with the SLD and PSL, claiming that it is the responsibility of the parties that won the elections—the SLD and PSL—to form a government. The UD authorities maintain that these parties have aroused the hopes of society, hopes that cannot possibly be fulfilled in the country's present situation, and therefore there is no question of the UD sharing a place with them in the government.

PSL leaders fear that a UD presence in the government would reestablish the old division into communists on the one hand and Solidarity on the other, in which case society's pent-up anger with the reforms could be directed against the PSL. The PSL is also afraid of the SLD's excessively liberal economic path.

However, the SLD leaders do not hold a uniform stance. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz would like to form a government immediately, without considering any party with Solidarity origins. Kwasniewski is said to oppose this

idea. "Would we ever keep the budget deficit within limits with [Waldemar] Pawlak [PSL leader] around?" asked a SLD politician.

Needles to say, the SLD and PSL leaders are reported to have held talks during the whole of yesterday on forming a government coalition. Apparently they considered whether Pawlak should be prime minister.

UP's Bugaj Interviewed on Post-Election Situation

AU2309163593 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 21 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Ryszard Bugaj, leader of the Union of Labor, by Wojciech Zaluska; place and date not given: "Winning Alone Is Not Enough"]

[Text] [Zaluska] On Sunday, Aleksander Kwasniewski was the most frequently-interviewed politician. Does that mean he is now the chief player on Poland's political stage?

[Bugaj] No. The key to the Polish situation remains in the hands of the Democratic Union [UD].

[Zaluska] Why?

[Bugaj] In order to run the country, it is not enough just to win the elections. The UD enjoys strong media support, so the media will never oppose it. The UD also has extensive foreign connections; the attitude of the West toward the changes in Poland depends largely on the UD. Lastly, the UD controls a major part of the state administration. There are doubts whether the adminsitratrion would adapt itself to a government without UD participation. Kwasniewski has won, but he is not in an easy situation.

[Zaluska] So you rule out a government without the UD.

[Bugaj] No. However, a Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]-Polish Peasant Party [PSL] coalition is possible.

[Zaluska] Because the party grass roots who cooperated with each other under the People's Republic would insist on such a coalition?

[Bugaj] That is not necessarily the reason. The SLD and PSL have won the elections, so they are in a sense forced to form a government. Nevertheless, I do not think a SLD-PSL government will last long. It will come under heavy attack inside and outside parliament.

[Zaluska] The UP will attack it as well?

[Bugaj] If the government produces a program that is acceptable to us, we might behave toward it just like the UD behaved toward the Bielecki government. However-,there is no question of the UP joining an SLD-PSL government.

[Zaluska] You seem to have nothing but pessimistic scenarios.

[Bugaj] No. There are another two possibilities. One is a broad coalition of the SLD, PSL, UP, and UD. Whether the UP belongs to it depends on this coalition's program. The second possibility is a minority government of experts, like in Italy. Virtually no parliamentary group identifies itself directly with this government, but most of them tolerate it, and sometimes even support it.

[Zaluska] Has President Walesa and his Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] lost?

[Bugaj] The president can form a government without parliament's assent for the duration of six months. I do not exclude such a possibility, but I do not think he has any ideas concerning the new situation.

[Zaluska] In the election studio, the president said that the political elites, including the UD, should realize that society's moods have shifted to the left. How should the UD react to that?

[Bugaj] The UD should realize that society does not want the reforms to proceed at such a hectic pace. Anyone thinking of accelerating the reforms should bear in mind that that is not what society wants.

[Zaluska] You said the previous parliament was dominated by the middle class and businessmen. It looks as if the pendulum has now swung in the opposite direction, because the new parliament will be dominated by left-wingers, people who are not self-employed.

[Bugaj] It is difficult to say. The SLD has emerged in first place, but we really do not know who it is supposed to represent. The SLD has made its loudest calls to pensioners, making them promises it will never be able to keep. In fact, the SLD has various links with the economy, and it also represents the interests of the so-called enfranchised nomenklatura.

Mazowiecki, Walesa Meet To Discuss Coalition

LD2309195993 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Relayed by Polonia television network]

[Text] During a talk with the president, the Democratic Union [UD] confirmed that it will not take part in a coalition with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The leaders of the UD spoke for over one and a half hours with Lech Walesa.

[Begin recording] [Tadeusz Mazowiecki, leader of the UD] Well, we were here at the invitation of the president. The talk was on the subject of the situation across the whole of Poland after the elections, our unease, and the unease of the president in association with this situation, and on the subject of the development of democracy and the protection of the reforms. That is what I can say.

[Unidentified correspondent] But what was the result of the talks? We know the subject. What did you agree on with the president as a result of these talks?

[Mazowiecki] We clarified for ourselves certain matters regarding mutual relations. I judge that we understand each other better. [end recording]

Tadeusz Mazowiecki added that the president did not seek to persuade the leaders of the UD into any alliances. During the president's meeting with the UD a special emissary brought a letter from the leader of the SLD to Lech Walesa.

Aleksander Kwasniewski informs the president of the commencement by the [Democratic Left] Alliance of talks on the creation of a stable government. Decisions by the statutory bodies of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] and its allies will be required, Aleksander Kwasniewski writes. He also informs Lech Walesa that Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz will reply to the president's letter on the matter of the designation of candidates for premier. Most probably, this will be on Tuesday or Wednesday, after internal consultations in the SLD.

Survey Shows Pawlak Favorite for Prime Minister

AU2409095393 Warsaw PAP in English 1110 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 23—Polish Peasant Party (PSL) leader Waldemar Pawlak is the most popular candidate for prime minister according to an opinion poll carried out by the Demoskop polling centre between September 10 and 14 (the elections were held on September 19).

Pawlak headed the list of 14 politicians supported by 19 percent of respondents, ahead of PM Hanna Suchocka (17 percent) and Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) leader Aleksander Kwasniewski (7 percent).

Joint fourth place was attained by Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) leader Leszek Moczulski, presidential economic adviser Andrzej Olechowski and Party X leader Stanislaw Tyminski, each on 5 percent.

In the case of an electoral victory of the SLD, 37 percent of respondents to the poll thought that the president should find a prime ministerial candidate from another party and 36 percent thought the candidate should come from the SLD.

Possible Government Coalitions Viewed

WS2409064293 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by E.K., E.Cz, and E.O.: "Coalition Building Blocks Hard To Assemble; The Bigger Cannot Do More"; information appearing in the last paragraph before the box by Ma.S.]

[Text] **The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has begun coalition talks with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Union of Labor [UP]. On election night, Aleksander Kwasniewski said that the best coalition for Poland would be an alliance between SLD and the Democratic Union [UD] because UD is the kind of political party that would assure good contacts with the West. However, UD absolutely ruled out a possibility of creating a government with either SLD or PSL. The Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] also intends to remain in the parliamentary opposition and represent those center-rightist groups in the Sejm that failed to gain seats in parliament.**

A day after the elections, SLD offered invitations for talks on forming a coalition to three parties: UD, PSL, and UP. UD rejected the possibility of participating in a government created by SLD. Pawlak's party [PSL] announced it will not make any binding decisions until a new prime minister is designated by the president. UP is willing to agree to such a coalition on the condition that another post-"Solidarity" group joins the coalition which, according to all the signs, would be UD. In such an arrangement, UP could play the role of a mediator between SLD and UD on the issue of creating a joint government. However, according to statements by UP leaders, SLD would have to "restrict its appetite" in this situation because it is not strong enough to take over the highest posts in the government and in the Sejm.

Big Misunderstanding

According to PSL politicians, the grand coalition would be composed of all the parliamentary parties, except for KPN and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR], although opinions are divided as to the presence of the latter. An SLD-PSL-UD-UP government could count on over 400 Sejm seats, which would not only assure its stability, but also a virtual lack of opposition.

UP is not fully convinced about the possibility of creating a coalition with BBWR's participation because the latter is an unknown party. "It is not known who is there and what can be expected of those people," Bugaj [UP leader] says. "Besides, we are not very enthusiastic about the proposition of forming a coalition with a party that may perhaps want to take the liberals' place in the future."

Before the elections, SLD officials also said that it is difficult to conduct talks on forming coalitions with a party that has no program. Connecting the "Network" [local Solidarity Trade Union commissions] with Olechowski [BBWR leader], as well as BBWR's 300 million zloty program, is unacceptable to SLD.

If ideas of a grand coalition materialized, it is still a puzzle as to who would undertake the mission of forming the government. Both SLD and PSL are eager to do it, and UD (if it changes its mind) could also be included. Agreement on this issue will not be easy to achieve.

Coalition of the Middle

A coalition of the middle is enjoying as big a support of PSL as the grand coalition. An alliance of three parties: UP, PSL, and UD, would leave the SLD in the opposition on the one hand, and the KPN on the other. All in all, this would create a strong, over 200-seat position. However, according to some PSL activists, that would be too dangerous for the government's stability, and apart from that—they say—the voters' will cannot be ignored. The voters very clearly chose SLD over the other parties. In a situation where a coalition of the middle would become a reality, its creation would most probably fall on PSL shoulders because PSL would be its strongest party. UD's function would be to guarantee good external contacts. However, a coalition of these three parties would not produce a two-thirds majority of seats. It is entirely possible that in this situation, coalition members could try to broaden it by including BBWR, in order to secure the president's favorable position when the law is enacted by parliament. But what is important is that a coalition of the middle, with or without BBWR, still would not produce a majority in the Senate.

On their part, SLD leaders insist that they are prepared to perform any kind of role in parliament, including being in the opposition, although the latter solution would "not be the best one for the country."

UP leader Ryszard Bugaj most likes the idea of forming a government coalition with PSL and UD. However, faced with the uncompromising position of UD which declares its willingness to remain in the parliamentary opposition, he himself is beginning to lose hope that it will ever be possible. "UD acts like it expects apologies, who knows from whom," he says clearly discouraged.

The Minimal Option

A union of SLD and PSL would be a coalition that would be simplest to assemble and would be stable, although it would not produce a two-thirds majority. Both of these parties are uniform enough that there are practically no fears that a secession by a small group of deputies will deprive the government of a parliamentary majority (which happened to Suchocka's government). Apart from that, two parties are capable of coming to an agreement, but the situation gets complicated when their numbers increase. Under this option, however, there would be no groups deriving from "Solidarity" in such a coalition, and this would recreate the division from before 1989, namely the division between those in power, and the "Solidarity" opposition. Probably everyone is afraid of that happening.

Despite that, PSL would be willing to participate in such a coalition, although with reluctance, in a case where it is not possible to assemble any other coalition. This is because, according to some, we cannot permit another dissolution of the parliament due to an inability to form a government.

The possible inclusion of UP in this type of coalition is out of the question since UP will not consent to this type of arrangement.

For Bugaj, recent events in Russia (the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament by Boris Yeltsin) are also a significant factor in forming a government coalition. According to UP's leader, this fact should mobilize politicians to create a government of the widest possible political spectrum. "We do not know what turn Russian events will take," Bugaj says. "It would be bad if one were to say that the communists are in power in Poland."

Late Wednesday night, UP chiefs met with Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Andrzej Machowski, UD's secretary general, on the initiative of UP leader Ryszard Bugaj. "Bugaj repeated the offer for Tadeusz Mazowiecki to take over the post of Sejm speaker. So far, it can be said that it is a nice gesture, but it is too early for a serious commentary," Andrzej Machowski told us. We found out unofficially that the possibility of cooperation in a government was also discussed.

[Box, p 2] Grand Coalition—412 seats
Government: SLD-PSL-UD-UP Minorities
Opposition: KPN, BBWR **Coalition of the Middle—239 seats**
Government: PSL-UD-UP Minorities
Opposition: SLD, KPN, BBWR **Minimal Option—301 seats**
Government: SLD-PSL Minorities
Opposition: UD, UP, KPN, BBWR.

Commentary Speculates on Policy of New Government

AU2309173793 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Sep 93 p 2

[Commentary by Piotr Zaremba: "What Will a SLD Government Be Able To Do?"]

[Text] The preliminary election results show that the left—the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], PSL [Polish Peasant Party], and Union of Labor [UP]—have gained complete control of the Sejm. It will, probably have the two-thirds majority needed to change the Constitution.

This means that the constitution—if the new Sejm passes it—will be consistent with the concepts of left-wing politicians. During discussion on the constitution in the previous Sejm, PSL, UP, and SLD politicians held similar views on the future order. They favored a Sejm with a single chamber and limitations on the powers of the president. A further motive that SLD people might have had for curbing the Belvedere's powers—following the example of states such as Germany—is a fear that Walesa might be the only serious rival on the path to absolute power.

The entire left has called for the introduction of extensive guarantees under social law into the constitution.

The SLD draft Social and Economic Charter was to ensure that Poles would receive a decent pension and that the state would undertake public works to stimulate the economy. Social rights (for example, the right to work, housing) were to serve as the basis for claims that citizens could lodge before law courts. Similar provisions were to be found in the SLD's draft constitution and ones that were only slightly watered down in the PSL draft, which was prepared with the participation of UP deputies. Politicians from the "Solidarity" parties were in agreement in criticizing those formulations, which were empty, unrealistic, and derived from the Polish People's Republic tradition. Today, one can expect those provisions to be forced through with opposition from the UD or at least from its right wing.

The new Sejm majority is decidedly secular, and that is how one can describe the SLD, the UP, a significant number of deputies from the UD and the PSL, and even some members of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland]. One can expect the new parliament to repeal the abortion law, which will be defended by some UD members such as Prime Minister Suchocka, or by the more Catholic deputies from the PSL, KPN, and BBWR [Non-Party Block in Support of Reforms]. That will no doubt also happen to the provision on respecting Christian values in radio and television. On the other hand, one cannot say what fate will befall the concordat, because the UD and PSL might decide to defend the document in order to avoid an all-out confrontation with the Catholic Church.

It is also hard to imagine a settling of accounts with communism, and it is doubtful whether the procedure aimed at placing General Jaruzelski before the State Tribunal will be continued. No grouping in the future Sejm—with the possible exception of the KPN—is interested in a vetting law. Until now, the SLD, UP, PSL, and UD have been opposed to procedures to check the pasts of politicians and state officials.

During the election campaign, "Solidarity" groups warned against revenge on the part of former communists in the form of, for example, personnel purges. The government, which will undoubtedly be dominated by the SLD or the PSL, will also be responsible for nominating a significant part of the administrative apparatus (voivodes, regional officials, education officials, voivodship doctors, and police commanders). The new, leftist cabinet will also have a say in the senior management of radio and television (the Radio and Television Committee, although it is in the process of being disbanded, is accountable to the government).

However, so far the Belvedere has customarily had a great influence on the activities of radio and television, and a struggle for control over those institutions may cause a conflict between Walesa and the left. There may also be a problem in those cases where the president has a say in appointments to certain posts (for example, ambassadors, who are appointed by the head of state acting on a recommendation made by the minister of foreign affairs). On the basis of the "small constitution," the president also expresses his opinion on appointments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of National Defense, which is something that Suchocka interpreted as meaning that the Belvedere had the right to propose candidates for those posts. That does not have to be interpreted in the same way by the new, non-"Solidarity" authorities, and that also applies to Walesa's customary right of interfering in appointments in the special services and the Army.

Skubiszewski Not Optimistic on Job Retention

LD2309140993 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] [Foreign Affairs Minister] Krzysztof Skubiszewski, asked by a correspondent from the Brussels daily LE SOIR if he would agree to remain foreign affairs minister in the new Polish leftist government, replied: Nobody has asked me yet; the communists threw me out of my university post. Therefore, I have serious doubts if the post-communists would like to keep me.

The interview with minister Skubiszewski was published on 23 September.

Iliescu Views Formula for Treaty With Hungary

AU2409090993 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 21 Sep 93 pp 1, 3

[Statement by President Ion Iliescu, to Gabriela Boceanu, in Bucharest on 19 September]

[Excerpts] Regarding the issue of the basic political treaty between Romania and Hungary, that came up during Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky's visit to Romania, we asked him and the Romanian president for their opinions. [passage omitted] Here is President Ion Iliescu's statement, made exclusively for DIMINEATA:

"In the last instance, we will have to find a suitable formula for both sides. This is what the two foreign ministers discussed. In principle, the Hungarian side declares, each time, that it has no territorial claims and proceeds from the idea of respect for existing borders. If this is the case, then we must find a way to clearly express this stand. I told them that, as far as the Romanian public is concerned, this is a basic prerequisite—particularly, since we had the experience of the Vienna Diktat. Mr. Jeszenszky believes that many of their positions were misconstrued as attempts to use possibly favorable circumstances to change borders. All right, I said, then let us find a way to express this idea of respect for borders, so as to allay would-be suspicions.

"In their turn, the Hungarians insist that the treaty should include certain guarantees regarding the minorities. I told them that, first of all, a state treaty should avoid questions that might be interpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of another state, particularly since we do not have any feelings of guilt in the matter of the rights granted to minorities. We have a constitutional principle of the prevalence of the international legislation over the Romanian legislation, consequently we have no problem in adjusting ourselves to international norms. But we are ahead of international regulations not only through our legislation, but even through our practice. It is important that we should find some way to include these two elements in the treaty, and I hope that we will find an adequate formula."

Melescanu Returns From EC Talks in Brussels

AU2209175593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1715 GMT 22 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 22/9/1993—"The meeting in Brussels officially marked the overcoming of a certain period in which there was the temptation to consider a group of three or four countries in advance and give them a treatment different from that of other countries, Romania included, unfortunately. It can be very clearly said that starting with this meeting the Common Market accepts the idea of equal treatment for all associated countries, although there are certain nostalgia, wishes, attempts, but I believe the squad of the associated countries will have to go together because it has the same legal condition vis-a-vis the European Community," said Teodor Melescanu, minister of state, minister of foreign affairs, on his return from Brussels. He added that "one of the issues all those present in the meeting touched was people's life in the six countries has not changed much for the better after this association and this message should get to all people."

Press Comments on Situation in Russia

AU2309195593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0932 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Bucharest ROMPRES, 23/9/1993—Developments in Russia have hit the headlines, with press writers generally pondering effects on Romania. [passage omitted]

"Yeltsin—Dictator for Democracy" runs a title in AZI, "A Life-or-Death Battle in Russia" says TINERETUL LIBER, "A War (Still) on Paper" writes EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, "Rutskoy, Hero of the Second Putsch" writes COTIDIANUL, "Is Russia on the Brink of a Civil War?" asks ADEVARUL.

"Political circles in Romania show concern over the developments in Russia," says TINERETUL LIBER, that adds: "While the power is cultivating ambiguity, the opposition is clearly favouring the reforming forces."

The Bucharest dailies put out statements made by President Iliescu ("We hope things will not worsen up to a confrontation leading to civil war"), of the government ("We hope that the political forces in the Russian Federation ... will find solutions apt to bring in further consolidation of the state of law, on the road of economic and social reforms...") and of the Democratic Convention, the main opposition alliance ("... It is only through free and fair elections, as President Yeltsin said, that the institutions of the state of law can get fortified ...")

"Boris Yeltsin's hope to get rid of the brakes in the reform process can be an example for his trust in the reform and for the will of a head of state to submit principles decisive for the future of that state to the people's will. Such an example would have been opportune, proportions guarded, when reform was put in place in Romania ... But continuing the parallel with the situation in Romania, Yeltsin's decision also contains a very dangerous 'example,' that of playing down the role of parliament in the life of a country," specifies AZI. [passage omitted]

PAC Leader Discusses Party, Political Issues

AU2209121093 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN No. 36 in Romanian 15-22 Sep 93 pp 8-9

[Interview with Nicolae Manolescu, senator and president of the Civic Alliance Party, PAC, by Ileana Lucaciu; place and date not given: "Mr. Iliescu Will Remain a Communist With a Humane Face"]

[Excerpts] [Lucaciu] Two days gave passed since the parliament debates on corruption. Finally, the conclusion was reached that corruption exists, but that the people who are corrupt have not been discovered. There were lengthy discussions on the definition of corruption, which can be sanctioned legally, politically, and morally. What is your opinion of attempts to define the various kinds of corruption?

[Manolescu] First, I would like to specify that it is not within the competence of parliament to deal with penal corruption. We do not have the competence nor practical possibilities to decide whether the cases we view as corruption are at variance with the Penal Code. [passage omitted] If, for instance, a minister or state secretary abuses his position in one way or another, it is clear-cut that the offense, the culpability, is a political one. As far as moral culpability is concerned, it is more general and forms the basis of all offenses. [passage omitted] Those people who were suspected of having committed acts of corruption should have asked, on their own accord, to be suspended from their positions until things had been clarified. It is futile for the General Court to make the decision to drop penal prosecution against certain ministers. There was no other possibility, because the Court cannot ignore the immunity of such parliamentarians as Ionel Roman or of such ministers as Viorel Hrebenciuc. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] There is talk that there is a sort of super-authority within the Democratic Convention, namely the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], which seems to harm the individuality of the political formations.

[Manolescu] It is a psychological one. At this point, the PNTCD is the party that incorporates the greatest number of members; aside from this, it incorporates numerous people of a certain age and with a certain political experience. This lends them a sort of superiority; they think that they can rely on this superiority in their relationship with other, younger formations and with younger people. [passage omitted] Essential decisions, however, not the ones regarding the appointment of candidates, are being discussed with all members and an agreement is reached. In this respect no one imposes his viewpoints.

[Lucaciu] What is the doctrine of your party?

[Manolescu] We started from two completely different positions. One, let us say, a national one, and the other an international one. The national premise presupposes that in Romania's current situation, after almost half a century of communism, it is absolutely impossible to return to pre-war liberalism. The second premise proves that in almost all countries where covert or overt liberal-oriented parties exist, their orientation is a neo-liberal one. Neo-liberalism has revised classical liberalism. I do not want to go into details, but many points in classical liberalism cannot be applied under the conditions of the economy at the end of the 20th Century. What was valid at the end of the 18th Century is no longer valid today.

[Lucaciu] You admit that PAC's doctrine leans toward neo-liberalism. Does this not mean a later merger with other such parties?

[Manolescu] So far, the only clearly defined neo-liberal party is the PAC. Thus, the question I would ask is whether the PAC would absorb other neo-liberal parties?! At this point, it is not an issue for the immediate future.

[Lucaciu] For the time being, within the PAC there have been certain shifts toward other people's neo-liberalism. You have had certain disillusions.

[Manolescu] I do not call them disillusions; maybe just at the human, personal level. Certainly, some people thought that they were closer to Mr. Patriciu's liberalism than to PAC's moderate liberalism. This is their problem, not the party's. I will not discuss the fact that some people also left because of other reasons, which are much more personal and interesting than the doctrinal ones.

[Lucaciu] There is a great deal of talk about a national unity government. This idea is also supported by the Cotroceni [presidency]. Would the PAC participate in such a government?

[Manolescu] Mr. Ion Iliescu proposed a national unity government immediately after the elections in September 1992. What he understood by this was that all important parties in parliament participate in government. This kind of outlook was not accepted by anyone, not even by the ruling party, I think. There may be certain things within parties that bring them close to each other, but there are also things that make them incompatible. By no means will we participate in a government along with parties whose doctrine is incompatible with our doctrine.

[Lucaciu] Can you quote any examples, please?

[Manolescu] With the PRM [Greater Romanian Party] or the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor]!

[Lucaciu] What about the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], would you join them in government?

[Manolescu] This has to be discussed. If the PUNR turned from a disguised ethnic party, which it is now, into a party with a proper political doctrine, we could discuss things. Now it is the opposite number of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], which—aside from affirming its national and anti-Hungarian spirit—has no doctrine. At this point, the problem of joining the PUNR in government is not posed, at least as far as we are concerned. In response to Ion Iliescu's formula, we proposed a coalition government. Such a government may include compatible formations or formations that, at one point, think that they

have common objectives. Thus, the six parties in parliament that have signed the well-known accord—five of the Democratic convention and the PD(FSN) [Democratic Party-National Salvation Front]—may, at one point, constitute the nucleus of such a coalition. Which could be joined by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] on one condition, namely if it clearly and frankly stated its commitment to relaunching the economic reform and everything this means: privatization, speeding up the rate of turning the centralized economy into a market economy, and so forth. When we made this counter-suggestion, Mr. Ion Iliescu backed off. After his return from Latin America, he made a statement that he was going to reshuffle the government within the old coalition formula—which he then did; and in a barbaric way he also said "let us do things stage by stage." In other words, for the time being he wants nothing else. In the next stage he might want something else. You see, Mr. Ion Iliescu wants a national unity government prompted by the idea of a consensus whereby everybody pulls at the same rope. But, in fact, when he is faced with a concrete proposal, he no longer agrees and resorts to the formula of a small government reshuffle. What I think is that Mr. Ion Iliescu wants nothing else but to fool people. Both at home and abroad. He does not want to cede any of the power he has accrued under the Constitution in the past two years. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] Could you give a portrayal of Mr. Ion Iliescu as a figure of the present-day world?

[Manolescu] I could, but I do not think that it is very appropriate to do so. [passage omitted] Through everything he has done, he has proved to be a very competent politician. Eventually, he even succeeded in setting up his party. The FSN fell apart, as was expected. Then he succeeded in obtaining enough power to seize the leadership of the political activity in Romania, without having any counter candidate. I do not know, however, whether Mr. Ion Iliescu also has the caliber of a great politician that is needed at this point to impose the necessary changes at home and to create the image of a civilized country abroad. Mr. Ion Iliescu has rather proved—politically speaking—a man of half measures, but they are extraordinary when we are talking of small steps, skill, and circumstances, while they are completely insufficient when we are talking of big strides and of deciding the country's long-term fate.

[Lucaciu] At one point, you said that the FSN's split was something to be expected. In your view, what is the fate of the current PDSR—the former FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front]—going to be? Do you foresee a possible split in this case?

[Manolescu] Yes. It is possible, because, similar to the—at least—two trends in the former FSN, one leaning to the left and another one to the right, there were at least two trends within the former FDSN, while part of it is very close to the PSM and PRM; still another part is more linked to economic realities, thus realizing that to turn hyper-centralism into supra-centralism and that to replace communism by socialism is impossible. If we examine the PDSR, which is quite a strange name, we realize that it is a subsidiary of the former communist parties in Eastern European countries. Someone once made a good remark: We did not have a communist party with a humane face during communism—as the PDSR is now—we were "blessed" with it afterward. It seems that this is a requirement of the transition: to go through the stage of a humane communism. But since all processes in history repeat themselves, and they repeat themselves at a rapid pace, I hope that this humane face of Romanian communism will not last as long as it did in Hungary, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, and that we will eventually have really democratic parties. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] Do you think that early elections are possible?

[Manolescu] Yes, only I do not know when this will happen. This depends on when we will reach the end of the rope. When will we reach it? This fall or next year, or at the end of this mandate, I do not know. And there is also the possibility for our parliament to sort out its problems. As long as parliament will be controlled by a majority that thinks that foreign investments mean selling the country, we will not be able to do anything. When these people will understand that to lease land to a foreign company for a period of 99 years in fact means to encourage affluence of capital and not selling the country, parliament will not have to be dissolved. And if this is not going to happen and the majority will continue to block such laws, then our activity is going to end, because we will have no one with whom to continue the reform process or to relaunch it. The reform process has come to a standstill.

[Lucaciu] Given the fact that the population is facing increasingly greater difficulties, early elections could end with a surprise. Maybe the electorate will regret the past and thus move toward the political left. Maybe they will not want the reform any more.

[Manolescu] Perhaps the electorate will surprise us and move to the left persuaded by populist slogans. It is always more convenient to believe the thing you wish were true than to believe that, if you renounce what you desire for some time, you will get it later under better circumstances. On the other hand, it is also true that great changes have occurred in the Romanian electorate in the past years. Let us just compare what happened in the elections in 1990 and 1993 and we will realize that a considerable change occurred. There is a parliamentary opposition representing 46.5 percent; thus it is no longer the almost fictitious opposition that existed after May 1990. I look at people and realize that many of the former preconceived ideas and mentalities have collapsed. Let me quote a single example. There is no longer the same reaction toward the PNTCD and PNL [National Liberal Party] as was the case in 1990 "thanks" to an unfortunate historic education that depicted the parties that had created modern Romania as parties of exploiters. These things have changed to a

certain extent. Others as well. Part of the active population has moved from the state sector to the private one. A middle class—true, very limited for the time being—of inventive people characterized by a spirit of initiative, who are building a capitalist type of economy in Romania, has emerged. It is a sad paradox, however, that the first capitalists in Romania are former nomenklatura and Securitate people. I will ignore the unpleasant moral aspect and say: This is of no importance, their children will be capitalists through and through and this is what is essential. Returning to the subject of early elections, the electorate may move toward the PSM. On one condition: If it promises concrete things that can be achieved. So far, the PSM has done nothing but criticize the reform and transition process and recall the achievements of the former, communist regime. I think that with such slogans it will not find very many ridiculous people—I do not want to use a stronger term to hurt them. Through the game of group or personal interests in the early elections, the PSM could win a few percentages among the electorate, but not more.

[Lucaciu] As a parliament member, can you note differences of ideas between the two vice presidents of the PSM, Adrian Paunescu and Teodor Mohora?

[Manolescu] Obviously. Paunescu is a poet, an artist in his own way, who says what he thinks himself rather than what he should say as party vice president, while Mr. Mohora is a 100 percent activist who says exactly what the boss wants him to say in accordance with the well-known principle of the hierarchy that functioned within the communist parties throughout the world. Paunescu may come up with surprising things for the communist doctrine with a humane face at any time, something that Mr. Mohora will never do. Paunescu's imagination probably makes up the sum total of the imagination of his colleagues in the PSM leadership, something that should not be ignored at all.

[Lucaciu] At one point you said, for example, that the PSM was not prepared for governing, for early elections, and that it would use populist slogans. Is the PAC ready for governing?

[Manolescu] I think that to govern requires three things and I dare say that, at least as far as two are concerned, we are ready. First, we have a program due to a doctrine. True, some of its points are clearer than others, but it exists. The second condition would be to have competent people. And I think that they exist both in our party and in other parties belonging to the Democratic Convention and the PD(FSN). [passage omitted] The third condition is more difficult to fulfill. Only competence is not enough, what is also needed is a certain experience in the field. While I am sure that we have competent people, I cannot say the same thing about experience, things are worse in this respect. An intelligent and competent person in one field might not be a good organizer. And there is another thing, no matter who comes to power now, any minister will have to work, at least for some time, with the existing infrastructure. And it is mainly made up of former people, because it was impossible for new people to emerge overnight. [passage omitted] With the passing of time, this problem will be solved. Let us not forget that there are very many people even within this infrastructure whose major interest it is to erase some traces and to preserve a number of privileges that they did not lose with the revolution. These people will always react against a democratic government. This is also one of the causes of the current corruption. Neither the FSN government, nor the Stolojan government, or the current one for that matter were able to hold those people in check. They will always pursue their own interests.

Things get solved by the passing of time. After the almost four years since the revolution took place, things have changed. Some of the people with an apathetic mentality have changed, because, if not they, then their relatives or children have joined private companies and that is when the objective game begins. I cannot imagine a former Securitate official, who is now heading a company, to return to the corner of a street to shadow dissidents. It is better to be in a boutique than prop the corner of a street. Slowly, but surely such people's interests will change. Speaking objectively, their interests will slowly come closer to the interests of democracy, to those of the market economy. These people will seal President Iliescu's fate. In December 1989, he was a providential figure because he was accepted by the Army, the Securitate, part of the Romanian intelligentsia, and part of the former nomenklatura. Slowly, but surely, President Iliescu will begin to be in the way of those people who brought him to power. Their interests will move away from his interests. To the end of his days, Mr. Iliescu will remain a communist with a humane face, while many of his 1989 allies will turn into capitalists. Then they will want a government that meets their desires and enables them to achieve their objectives. Mr. Ion Iliescu will no longer be able to play that game. Naturally, then we will witness a change and a president from another political spectrum will emerge.

[Lucaciu] If you were asked to become director general of Romanian Television, would you accept that position?

[Manolescu] God forbid! It is something I do not know how to do. Television is a profession. I suppose I would cut a much worse figure even than Mr. Everac. I know nothing about the technical part, nor about the other things, and I am not a good organizer.

[Lucaciu] Now you are a politician, not only a man of culture. Thus, could you tell me your opinion of the role television has to play or should play at this stage?

[Manolescu] First we had a televised revolution and then a real one. Consequently, we have to admit that television is guiding at least 50 percent of Romanian political activity. A politician with media exposure is worth at least three politicians with no media exposure. Television can manipulate things in a subtle way. I have always said that, during Ceausescu's time, everyone, including Ceausescu himself,

thought that television was lying. No one was under the illusion that everything shown on television was true. That was his game. At this point, things are much more complicated. Television has learned a very subtle method of mixing truth with lies, what is plausible and not plausible. The viewer now has to know how to choose between lies and truth from a pile of lies, something that is very difficult. Through the education of former television, people are ready to accept everything or nothing. The 1989 change made the viewers, who until then believed in absolutely nothing, believe almost everything. The time has come for them to learn that one should not believe everything. The television's manipulation of public opinion also explains the result of the 26 September 1992 elections. It is not the electorate as such that is to blame for the fact that a communist party in structure and orientation has come to power. Television is to blame. Complete independence of the television would be profitable for democracy. And, naturally, the existence of a great number of independent television channels would create the diversity of opinion that the press has.

Article Justifies Military Accord With Russia

AU2409091193 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Ion Moise: "The Military Accord With Russia Is No Reason for Dispute"]

[Text] To inform readers correctly and to eliminate certain erroneous remarks in the press in connection with the forthcoming signing in Bucharest of an "Accord Between the Ministry of National Defense of Romania and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on Military Cooperation," it is necessary to clarify a few things.

The aforementioned accord is part and parcel of the series of cooperation documents concluded with the Armies in Western and Eastern European states. This accord does not include special clauses or chapters that may not be included in the other, already existing, accords of the same type.

On the basis of the way it has been formulated, the accord sanctions the position of partners with equal rights. As is well known, its text was endorsed by the Supreme Defense Council and the Romanian Government.

The document does not stipulate positions of subordination or coordination on the part of Russia. It provides for mutual consultations in the area of military and cadres training, exchanges in the area of culture, art, and the mass-media, mutual information on the management of air space and anti-air defense, possible consultations of archives, tending of heroes' monuments and cemeteries on the territories of the two states, and the exchange of experience regarding the Army reform process.

The Romanian Army is interested in maintaining very good bilateral relations with neighboring states, the NATO and WEU [Western European Union] member countries, with the armies of all countries in the world for the benefit of better understanding and cooperation in the interest of improving trust and security and preventing crisis situations.

The Romanian Army's military relations with the armies of other states are part and parcel of the general orientation of Romania's foreign policy, a rational policy of opening, without any reservations, to all directions and of participating, on the basis of partnership, in the CSCE process, a process in which Romania is participating with equal rights and obligations, together with the European countries, the United States of America, Canada, and the Russian Federation.

Consequently, there are no reasons for such narrow interpretations as: "The Romanian Army in the tow of pan-Slavism" or "The Romanian-Russian Military Accord leads to disputes" among the Romanian generals, as well as other such comments in publications, which are motivated from the point of view of the political capital some parties and formations want to gain, while they are not motivated from the point of view of national interests.

A military policy of cooperation and collaboration with any state, including the Russian Federation (which is an important economic, military, scientific, and demographic power) is more profitable than a policy of hostility. The world has changed. Despite the conflicts that still exist, the world community is making efforts in the direction of peace and security, and the demographic process. Noteworthy political and military figures in Europe and the United States no longer view the Russian Federation as an opponent and as being hostile to the Western world. A way of thinking that is opposed to this idea would be at least out of step.

Prosecutor General Estimates Crime Rate

AU2309190193 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1647 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 23/9/1993—Available data show that there have been more murders in Romania in 1993, but their number is smaller than in 1991, said Romania's Prosecutor-General Ion Manea Dragulin during a news conference. He declared against bringing the death penalty back, accusing the press of having generated a real psychosis with the population on this matter. Referring to corruption, Dragulin said it keeps at high rates. The number of people under investigation and of those sued in court shows an intensification of the activity unfolded by legal bodies in investigating such cases, he said.

He explained to the press what happened to the terrorists during the December 1989 events: of the 800 people suspected of having committed terrorism acts, 450 proved to be officers of the Securitate's Fifth Department, and 350 had different occupations. After they were checked on and investigated, no charge could be retained, and all the alleged terrorists were set free.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 24 September

WA2409173593

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Croatian Assembly demands UNPROFOR expand mandate or withdraw; UNPROFOR Commander Cot says troops will withdraw if mandate not renewed ... Serbian party in Croatia demands resignation of Krajina president ... Croats release Muslim POW's.

UN PROTECTION FORCES

ASSEMBLY PASSES UNPROFOR RESOLUTION (Zagreb Radio): Croatian Assembly passes resolution demanding UNPROFOR withdraw from Croatia by 30 November if it does not expand its mandate to enable it to disarm Serbian forces in Krajina. UNPROFOR Commander Cot says if Croatian Government does not renew its mandate before it expires on 30 September, UN troops "must leave." (LD24O9O9O593, LD23O9135493)

POLITICAL

SERBIAN PARTY DEMANDS HADZIC RESIGN (TANJUG): Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia demands "immediate resignation" of Krajina president Hadzic, saying that he "failed to take necessary defense measures" before a Croatian offensive in early September. Party calls for meeting of Krajina assembly to discuss "unlawful monopoly of political power" by Hadzic and his followers. (LD23O9155693)

HUMANITARIAN

CROATS RELEASE MUSLIM POW's (Zagreb Radio): Bosnian Croats release 555 Muslim POW's, including 106 Muslim men "who are under well-founded suspicion" of commiting war crimes, from "detention center" near Capljina. (LD23O9175493)

Strong Clashes in Mostar; Muslims Accused of Massacre

LD2409084693 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Zdenko Vranjes reporting for Croatian radio from Mostar.

Strong infantry clashes are in progress in Mostar this morning. Judging by explosions and infantry fire, the fiercest fighting is going on in Boulevard Street in the town center.

Following fierce battles yesterday, in which Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units drove the Muslim army out of the village of Rastani, the northern suburbs are mainly quiet. The HVO has reported that the Muslim army last night transferred its forces from the town northward.

Croatians who have escaped from Jablanica testify to yet another crime committed by the Muslims. They claim that 10 days ago the Muslim army killed more than 30 Croatian civilians—women, children, and the elderly—in the village of Grabovica between Mostar and Jablanica. The massacre was committed by a group of Muslims from Sandzak headed by Ramiz Celo. This is said in a statement of the HVO main headquarters.

Soldiers Leave Positions in Sarajevo

AU2309193193 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Report by Milica Lalovic from Sarajevo]

[Text] The Muslim forces in Sarajevo today violated the agreed cease-fire by attacking the Serbian defense positions in Jevrejsko Groblje. They were attacking by artillery, mortars, and infantry arms. Nobody among the Serbian soldiers was hurt. There was material damage incurred on the buildings. There were not other clashes in other parts of the Sarajevo battlefield, with the exception of Muslim snipers.

The Muslim media have informed that in the course of previous night and yesterday a division has occurred within the units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Sarajevo. A large number of fighters who support the policy of [leader of the Bosnian Croats] Mate Boban had left their units and combat positions, while a certain number of them even left the town.

The Muslim radio Sarajevo today reports of an incident between its army and the members of the French UN peace troops in the town center, without giving any details.

Today's regrouping of the Muslim army and its concentration in the direction Marijin Dvor-town center is being associated with the departure of HVO soldiers from the front lines in this part of Sarajevo.

Fighting Reported From Mostar, Vitez, Sarajevo

AU2409111593 Paris AFP in English 1036 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Report by Francis Curta]

[Excerpts] SARAJEVO, Sept 24 (AFP)—[passage omitted] Despite a cease-fire, fighting between Bosnian Croats and Moslem-led government forces was continuing in the southern town of Mostar, and there was shelling Thursday [23 September] of the central Croat-held part of Vitez, apparently targetting Croat headquarters there, the spokesman said.

In Sarajevo, there was renewed shelling Friday morning with sniper fire reported near the presidential building. [passage omitted]

The fire-fight in Sarajevo appeared to have been kicked off by an exchange of sniper fire between the two sides, followed by the Serbs' firing of 50 tank and 24 mortar rounds, along with anti-aircraft weapons.

Hospitals in Sarajevo reported eight wounded on Thursday.

The UNPROFOR spokesman also reported fighting in the Gornji Vakuf area of central Bosnia, with small arms and artillery fire back and forth between the Moslem and Croat lines.

Sarajevo radio said the shelling of Gornji Vakuf continued Friday.

There was limited Moslem-Croat fighting in the Novi Travnik area of central Bosnia, where Croat forces helicopters were reported to be flying at night, Aikman said. UN forces are implementing a no-fly zone over the war-ravaged republic.

There were also reports of sporadic mortaring opposing Moslem and Serb forces in the western Bihac region, he added.

Meanwhile, humanitarian convoys were still experiencing major difficulties in getting around the country, UN High Commissioner for Refugees spokesman Ray Wilkinson said Friday.

A convoy headed for Mostar had just been forced back because of the fighting and another 13-truck convoy had spent two and a half days getting from Sarajevo to Tarcin, a distance of about 40 kilometers (25 miles), Wilkinson said.

The convoy, with 50 tons of food for some 39,000 people in the Tarcin area, among them 19,000 refugees, was several times re-routed along narrow mountain roads, notably because of a road block by Serb women and children protesting stalled talks on the exchange of prisoners, he said.

Meanwhile, a total of 516 Moslem prisoners, all of them malnourished, were released Friday morning into the

hands of the International Committee of the Red Cross after being transported from a Bosnian Croat camp at Dretelj, southern Herzegovina, to the island of Korcula, off the Croatia coast, Wilkinson said.

The former prisoners, who were being put up in hotels, were to be interviewed by the Red Cross to ascertain where they wished to go.

Some 450 more Moslem prisoners, released earlier this month from prison camps at Dretelj and Gabela, were expelled by the Croats to Jablanica.

Wilkinson said field sources estimated the number of prisoners detained by various factions in Bosnia at between 4,000 and 10,000.

Hundreds Released From Detention Camp

LD2309175493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] In accordance with the Geneva declaration signed by Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, in line with the decision of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and under the agreement reached following a visit by Mate Granic, Croatian vice premier and foreign minister, to the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, 541 prisoners were released today from the detention center in Dretelj, near Capljina.

The released prisoners include 106 Muslim men who are under well-founded suspicion of—as members of Muslim armed forces—having committed criminal acts and crimes punishable according to law on warfare. However, showing its good will and trying to encourage the speedy exchange of prisoners with the Muslim side until all prisons are closed down, the Croat authorities of Herceg-Bosna will release even those people from the center in Dretelj.

Fourteen prisoners who need medical care also left the detention center today. (Claudio Demscini), head of the Medjugorje office of the International Red Cross, said that all of them will find temporary accommodation on the island of Korcula.

High Profits of UNPROFOR in B-H War

93BA1461A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Aug 93 pp 14-16

[Article by Marko Barisic: "1,500 Marks To Get Out of Bugojno"]

[Text] A woman displaced from Bugojno, a city in central Bosnia recently taken by the Muslim forces, who has been staying at the seaside, has in past days been persistently attempting to borrow from friends and acquaintances 1,500 to 2,000 German marks [DM]. She needs them, she says, to combine with the help of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in getting out her captive husband, who remained in the city. In other words, that is what the UNPROFOR collects for getting a civilian out of Bugojno. She has the alleviating circumstance that a girlfriend of hers is an employee of the UN peacekeeping forces and has provided her with a "connection." She says that that is not a big sum compared to other cities. To get a civilian out of Sarajevo the UNPROFOR charges 5,000 marks, while the price for Mostar is the highest at the moment: DM10,000. She does not want her name mentioned, and those who have been extracted from the cities mentioned also refrain from appearing in public: Most of them have left relatives behind in those cities, and they do not want to cause them harm, and in addition they do not want to break the chain whereby people are buying their way out, which the UN peacekeeping forces have maintained for quite a long time now. This is a lucrative business, we were told by the woman driven out of Bugojno, who teaches in a high school there, more lucrative than smuggling cigarettes, alcohol, or other goods, which is also under control of the Blue Helmets.

Their convoys entering the region of Herzegovina and central Bosnia, led by combat vehicles, are exempted from inspection of local authorities at checkpoints. They pass freely with their goods and civilians, and along the way they earn additional money. The UNPROFOR's reason why the price is so high for getting civilians out of a particular city is that they do not want to get involved in ethnic cleansing, and if they do this for individuals, then this must be in strict secrecy and at a high price.

The woman driven out of Bugojno sold all her gold objects, withdrew the savings which she had in a Croatian bank, borrowed from friends, and then in the end gave the Blues DM5,000 to get her husband and two sons out of Bugojno. She delivered the money, the Blues departed, and now there is nothing for her to do but wait for the UNPROFOR to perform its part of the bargain—to rescue her nearest and dearest from Bugojno.

Too High a Price for Freedom

Thus, the peacekeeping forces in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the British in central Bosnia, have actually become traders in "white slaves," just as was once the case in Africa. They are using the most recent conflict between Croats and Muslims, and, just as recently occurred in the conflict between the Croats and Serbs, with the excuse that they do not want to engage in ethnic cleansing by getting the remaining civilians out, mainly prisoners and the elderly, they are collecting a charge for every individual they get out. Those who cannot pay the sum which the Blues have set for the particular city have no prospects whatsoever of the UNPROFOR helping them to rescue their family members, who remain indefinitely in captivity, that is, in a region under control of the opposite side. That is why one analyst was correct in concluding that mainly poor people have remained in the cities of central Bosnia and Herzegovina under control of the forces of the other nationality: those who did not have friends and relatives to whom they could go and those who after they were

captured did not have enough money to pay the UNPROFOR to depart for freedom.

There has never been any doubt up to now that the peacekeeping forces of the UN have been smuggling goods to the black market in certain cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially cigarettes and alcohol. Nor should we have any illusions about their smuggling weapons as well, for various sides at various times. But it is an astounding fact confirmed from several sources that the peacekeeping forces are "smuggling" even civilians for money. For 100 civilians rescued from central Bosnia, the British group of Blue Helmets collected about DM200,000.

War Is a Business

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is good business for them. If we include in those earnings what the Blues get from the arms they sell in Bosnia and Herzegovina, allegedly as representatives of firms in their homeland, and the income from smuggling food, cigarettes, and alcohol, we can only imagine the lucrative earnings that group of old veterans and professional legionnaires gains from the misfortune of the people of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The primary tasks with which they were sent by the United Nations, to preserve the peace and protect the civilian population on the space of the former Yugoslavia, have been flip-flopped into their opposite. They are leading the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina into hell, they are cementing the status quo created by aggression, they want the agony to last as long as possible, because in that case they will earn still more. Their politicians who have sent them on that mission know all that is happening thanks to the information from their intelligence services. So, as the British Government did recently with Operation Irma, from time to time they try to clear their conscience with a selective humanitarian gesture and represent themselves as peaceful people of the Western world brought up on humanitarian principles.

The Blues Are Building Bunkers

This is also evident from what the Blues are doing in Croatia. Not only on the demarcation line near Osijek, but also in the region of the other UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones, the UN peacekeeping forces have in the last month been building bunkers and digging trenches on positions toward the Croatian forces. Given their number and strength, an outside observer might think that a conflict in the near future is being prepared between the UNPROFOR and the Croatian Army. However, those who are informed about the situation know that members of Serbian paramilitary forces might jump into those trenches as soon as the situation becomes tense at all. So, the UN peacekeeping forces have the role of a shield for the Serbian quasi-state in Croatia. When mention is made in this context of all the unperformed resolutions of the Security Council that talk about those UNPA regions as Croatian territory and about the decision of the Council to restore Croatian authority in them, one gets a fuller picture of the role of the Blue Helmets in Croatia as well. They are creating an expanded Serbia on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, they are not protecting civilians or the borders of the newly created states. When we add to that activity of theirs the role which they have in Bosnia and Herzegovina smuggling goods and rescuing civilians for money, we get the full picture of the hired Western legionnaires who should be told as soon as possible: [in English in the original] Go home!

The UN peacekeeping forces are more a colonial remnant in these parts than a factor for stabilization and peace. But it is not our intention to further compromise the peacekeeping forces and their auxiliary personnel. Enough time has already passed, and they themselves have compromised themselves excessively. But it has to be said that it has become obvious that what the Blue Helmets want in staying where they are now is to legally create an expanded Serbia and destroy two states: Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aside from smuggling, maintaining the status quo, spreading AIDS, and unscrupulous "business" with civilians, they have never even tried to do anything else.

Granic Comments on Rejection of Mandate

LD2309150993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Mate Granic, vice president of the government and minister for foreign affairs, has stressed that Croatia cannot await the outcome of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is, as Granic put it, UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali's clear intention. In connection with this Granic added:

[Begin Granic recording] Likewise, it is also unacceptable that there are several elements in the report indicating that there is shared blame for the failure of the full implementation of the Vance plan and all UN Security Council resolutions—that is, that the mandate of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] should be implemented as envisaged. All of this suggests to us that we cannot wait for the definitive denouement of agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly if we thoroughly analyze the latest propositions tabled by the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference. These include a referendum on the secession of individual republics—meaning the republic of Srpska's secession—and all other realistic possibilities in the wake of this, as well as strong pressure for the beginning of the lifting of sanctions on Serbia.

All of this suggests to us that on the one hand we must be very firm that we cannot accept such a mandate; on the other hand we must also be very flexible in negotiating further with the UN Security Council and secretary general and in accepting every initiative in the direction of seeking a peaceful solution. [end recording]

Cot, Thornberry on Future of Deployment

LD2309135493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Excerpt] If Croatia does not renew UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate, we must leave. This was said by UNPROFOR's commander, General Jean Cot, at a regular press conference in Zagreb from which Tihomir Vinkovic is reporting.

[Vinkovic] We have not come here by force, but through an agreement between two sides, so if one of them does not want us, we have to leave, Cot repeated. Talking about the latest report by UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali on the future of UNPROFOR's mandate on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR Deputy Commander Cedric Thornberry said that he believed that some sections of it are confusing.

According to Thornberry, the most unclear point is the possible separation of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Macedonia. It is not clear how these mandates could be implemented, but a decision will be made by the UN Security Council, Thornberry said. Gen. Cot believes that one of UNPROFOR's great successes is the taking over of responsibility in the Medak area from which the Croatian Army has withdrawn. This is the first time that a signed agreement has actually been implemented, Cot said. [passage omitted]

Parliament Passes Resolution on Mandate

LD2409090593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0805 GMT 24 Sep 93

[Text] Last night the Chamber of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament passed a resolution on the status of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] after the expiry of its mandate on 30 September. Firstly, the representatives did not agree with the latest report on proposals by the UN secretary general Butrus-Ghali on extending the mandate because they did not ensure a ceasefire or an end to hostilities, and did not guarantee the implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions which would secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, the disarming of all terrorist groups in occupied territory, monitoring of Croatia's borders, and the safe return of displaced persons.

Secondly, the Chamber welcomed the willingness expressed in Dr. Ghali's report to divide the UNPROFOR mandate, which would meet one of the Chamber's demands made on 7 September.

Thirdly, under the present conditions, and without significant changes, the Chamber could not accept an extension to the UNPROFOR mandate, and hence seeks the withdrawal of UN forces from Croatia by 30 November this year.

And fourthly, the Chamber gave its support to the letter sent by President Tudjman to Dr. Ghali on 13 September and the reports on the standpoint of the Government on the latest developments concerning the UNPROFOR mandate, and requested that authorized representatives of the Republic of Croatia should do everything possible in order that the UN Security Council should reach a solution which would guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders.

Former RSK Ministers Arrested on Espionage Charges

AU2309180393 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] The Interior Ministry of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] has arrested Veljko Dzakula, former RSK deputy prime minister, Dusan Ecimovic, former information minister, and Mladen Kulic from Okucani. The abovementioned individuals are suspected of threatening the territorial integrity of the RSK, obstructing the struggle against the enemy, and espionage.

According to the results of the criminal investigation conducted so far, the suspects are guilty—individually or jointly—of maintaining contact with the Croatian authorities and police during the past year with the intention of unconstitutionally bringing down and

seceding parts of the RSK territory, and annexing them to the Republic of Croatia. They spread false information in western Slavonia, thereby discouraging citizens from engaging in the justified struggle for freedom. This is stated in the RSK Interior Ministry's statement.

Croatian Attacks on Serb Krajina Reported

LD2409011393 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2314 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, September 23 (TANJUG)—The Army of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia on Thursday [23 September] again opened artillery fire on civilian targets and settlements in the south of the republic of Serb Krajina (RSK), whose territory is under the protection of the United Nations.

Serb villages in the wider region of Drnis came under the heaviest Croatian artillery fire, the RSK Army command said in a statement on Thursday.

Croatian units also opened tank fire from Mount Velebit on the area of Krusevo near Obrovac, the statement said. The RSK Army command reported more material damage but no casualties.

Over the past year and a half, Croatia launched three offensives on the RSK, a state proclaimed by Serbs in the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia in response to its violent secession from the former Yugoslav Federation.

In the offensive launched on September 9, the Croatian Army razed to the ground 11 Serb villages ignoring the fact that the RSK has been a U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) since spring last year. The Croatian Army killed at least 66 Serb civilians and soldiers in the villages of Divoselo, Citluk and Pocitelj south of Gospic.

Pressured by the U.N. Security Council, Croatian troops pulled out of the three villages but, as confirmed by U.N. officials, during the withdrawal they systematically destroyed the villages, leaving not a living soul behind.

SDS Demands Resignation of RSK President

LD2309155693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1011 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, 23 Sep (TANJUG)—The Serb Democratic Party (the original one) [SDS] has demanded the immediate resignation of Goran Hadzic, the president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], the SDS Main Committee announced today.

Explaining its demand, the SDS says that as the supreme commander of the Serb army in Krajina, Hadzic is responsible for "the loss of territories and human life in Croatia's aggression in the southern and Lika regions of Krajina."

In its statement, the SDS says that both Hadzic and the General Staff of the Serb army of Krajina failed to take necessary defense measures prior to the aggression.

The SDS calls for a meeting of the RSK Assembly to "discuss an unlawful monopoly of political power by the forces and centers of power, who are working against the interests of the Serbian nation and the RSK."

Federal

Data on New Yugoslav Army Commanders

93BA1465A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Sep 93 p 16

[Article by Borislav Solesa: "Who New Commanders in Armed Forces of Yugoslavia Are: Officers Blackened by Gunpowder"]

[Text] *The majority of the newly appointed commanders have more or less participated in war operations in the former Yugoslavia.*

The published choices of generals and commanders of the army, Navy, and Air Force say more about the new General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia [VJ], which was completely filled the day before yesterday, than any official interpretations do. It is as if artillery Major General Momcilo Perisic, who is now the chief of the General Staff of the VJ, selected, almost without exception, people who for a year or longer have been at the center of the bloody war of the South Slavs.

Maj. Gen. Nikola Mandaric, who succeeded the "unobtrusive" Lieutenant General Dragoljub Simonovic in the post of deputy chief of the General Staff, underwent his baptism of fire in Eastern Slavonia.

Dojcilo Isakovic, a former battleship captain who has now become a rear admiral and commander of the Navy, brought up many generations of seamen on naval and commercial ships in Split, at the Naval Academy. He is well-acquainted with the commander of the neighboring Croatian Navy, Admiral Sveta Letica, and other high-ranking Croatian officers, especially Bozidar Grubisic and Joze Erceg, as well as the Macedonian admiral and colleague from Split, Dragoljub Bucinov. In addition to the highest-ranking Croatian officers, he personally knows every single captain on vessels in Croatia, because he taught the majority of them. And they have been followed by the voice of a professor who has a great deal of patience and love for his students. Under dramatic circumstances, he had to leave Lora, Split, Vis, Lastovo, and Dalmatia in general, together with those who due to a confluence of circumstances remained loyal to the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. Rear Adm. Isakovic will now find himself in a thankless position, from which he must bring order to a Navy full of unclarified relations, family and national dramas that are far from any happy ending.

Matters are very similar in the Air Force, where Brigadier General Miloje Pavlovic faces many walls that must be "torn down." Gen. Bozidar Stevanovic, who long stood out as a candidate for the post of chief of the General Staff, so that he set up a long-term organization in the Air Force as well, is now followed by a person who must settle matters. Stevanovic, who even piloted a "MiG-29," much faster than the "Orao" that Pavlovic uses, also had much greater military ambitions. Otherwise, Gen. Pavlovic too was among the group of officers who carried out a series of missions during the war in Croatia.

Through a confluence of circumstances, Lt. Gen. Jevrem Sokic, who became the commander of the 1st Army after Lt. Gen. Vladimir Stojanovic was retired, has experienced the war in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Surrendering command of the Varazdin Corps to his colleague, Gen. Vlada Trifunovic, he was transferred to Sarajevo, to the "Marshal Tito" barracks, which he deserted in the last clash.

Brig. Gen. Dusan Samardzic, a tanker, was the chief of staff of the 3d Army while its commander was Momcilo Perisic, but now he is its first officer. That army, which extends across the "shaky" terrain of Kosovo toward Macedonia, faces a hard test of patience and tactics in dealing with two practically irreconcilable concepts—Serb and Albanian—in connection with the status of the province of Kosovo and Metohija.

In Podgorica, Lt. Gen. Pavle Strugar has been succeeded by Brig. Gen. Bozidar Babic as head of the 2d Army, which is primarily deployed in Montenegro. This position should not be new and unknown to Babic, because until recently he held the post of Montenegrin minister of defense. It is not unessential that while he was head of the Montenegrin Ministry of Defense (until recently), that ministry was practically shut down.

The commander of Belgrade city defense, Brig. Gen. Srboljub Trajkovic, and the commander of the Novi Sad Corps, Boro Ivanovic, have plenty of experience from the war in Croatia. While the retired chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Zivota Panic, directed war operations in Vukovar, one of the guardists involved in fighting was Lieutenant Miodrag Panic, who has now been appointed commander of the Special Forces Corps. That prestigious corps, which is under the direct competence of the General Staff, was previously headed by Brig. Gen. Mile Mrksic, who is now a chief in the General Staff.

The new chief, Perisic, is convinced that Serbs and Montenegrins love their military, and leans toward the definition "there is no state without the nation and no military without the nation and the state." The concept of a professional military tailored to society and the state is his basic professional motto. Will he succeed in materializing this idea?

Serbia

Seselj Comments on Confidence Vote, Events in Russia

AU2309145093 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Sep 93

[Text] At the Serbian Radical Party's [SRS] regular press conference, its leader, Vojislav Seselj, said pensioners, people disabled in the war, and the families of those

killed in action, should be awarded one-time financial aid, since—according to him—they are in the gravest position. Zoran Vaskovic has the details.

The SRS believes that this one-time aid cannot be less than the equivalent of 100 German marks. The question is how to secure these funds. Vojislav Seselj says:

[Begin Seselj recording] The SRS believes that the funds can be secured through the sale of state property, real estate, and everything that is surplus to both the republican and Federal Governments' needs. We believe that the Army must immediately start selling off their surplus property: various farms, hunting grounds, and recreation complexes. [end recording]

The leader [words indistinct]. He repeated that a motion for a vote of no confidence in the republican government would be put forward on 27 September. However, Seselj is not certain that the republican government will fall. He said that the deputies of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] had announced that they would not be participating in parliament's work on that occasion, and 125 votes are needed for the no confidence vote.

Commenting on the events in Russia, Dr. Seselj said that it was good that the Federal Government was not meddling in Russia's internal affairs. As for the SRS, their sympathies lie with the opposition and the Russian parliament. The SRS had expected the triumph of the left in Poland, because the right had compromised itself, Seselj said.

Arrest Warrant Reportedly Issued for Muslim Leader

AU2309123493 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 22 Sep 93 p 10

[Report by M. Niciforovic: "Police at Doorstep"]

[Text] The department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sandzak has received an order for the arrest of Sulejman Ugljanin, leader of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] for Sandzak. Since Ugljanin is not in Yugoslavia and is currently beyond the reach of the bodies of prosecution in our country, an international arrest warrant will probably be issued for him.

This piece of information has still not been confirmed officially in Novi Pazar. However we have found out from reliable sources that the district public prosecutor in this town was working urgently on "the Ugljanin case." The SDA leader has been accused of participating in a group that has been arming the Sandzak Muslims, forming paramilitary formations, and preparing an armed rebellion.

Over 50 of Ugljanin's associates (some sources claim over a 100) are already under arrest and will soon face charges for the same criminal acts.

"Four policemen of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Novi Pazar came on 13 September to the party's premises with a warrant for the arrest of our chairman," says Rasim Ljajic, SDA's secretary general. "None of them wanted to explain what Ugljanin had done wrong. We were also unable to get an explanation from the chief of the Novi Pazar Ministry of Internal Affairs, who directed us to the bosses in Belgrade. We sent a letter to Zoran Sokolovic on Friday, demanding an explanation from him."

They are still quiet about this matter in the Novi Pazar Public Prosecutor's Office, which is the only institution authorized to start legal proceedings against the SDA leader. We have found out unofficially that the public will soon be informed about the case in detail.

Sulejman Ugljanin has been abroad, mostly in Turkey, ever since a large group of SDA activists was arrested, and large quantities of arms and ammunition were found, together with plans for the destruction of important roads and facilities, and the assassination of prominent Serbs in the region. Ugljanin has not been in Novi Pazar for over six months, most likely for fear that he would be arrested, as he has been informed through special channels that some of his terrorists that have been arrested have owned up, and accused him of everything.

[Box, p 10]

Wrong Move

Almost all the Serbs in the Raska region [Sandzak] believe that the arrest of Sulejman Ugljanin—even if he has committed several criminal acts—would be unnecessary now that the majority of the Muslims in Sandzak have understood where his policies were leading them.

Many believe that a court trial would actually benefit Ugljanin, who wants to make a martyr and hero of himself. There are also quite a few of those who fear that this trial would turn into a farce, such as the recent court trial of the SANDZAK magazine editor.

Goals of Radical Shadow Government Detailed

93BA1465B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Sep 93 p 8

[Article by Ivana Anojcic: "People in the News: Who Is Tomislav Nikolic, Head of Radical Shadow Government"]

[Text] *The person who founded the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] with Seselj; he will organize work in the government like construction crews; Nikolic praises St. Dimitrije and listens to pop music from the 1960's.*

If the radicals come to power, Serbia could become a duchy, because Tomislav Nikolic, the prime minister of their shadow government, is a duke. All jokes aside, the title of Serbian chetnik duke was conferred on Nikolic by

order of Vojislav Seselj, and he was proclaimed and anointed on 15 May of this year in Knezina, near Romanija.

Thus far, only Duke Seselj has conferred this rank, but now the Dukes' Council of the Serbian Chetnik Movement has assumed that task. Indeed, besides Seselj there are currently 18 dukes who have earned this honor—and obligation.

When Tomislav Nikolic, the vice chairman of the party, chairman of the party caucus in the Serbian Assembly, and deputy to the Chamber of Republics of the Federal Assembly, became the head of the Serbian Radical Party shadow government, none of his acquaintances were surprised. He and Seselj founded the SRS in February 1991. He was first a member of the People's Radical Party, which by linking the majority of local committees united with the Serbian Chetnik Movement, from which the Serbian Radical Party emerged after the signing of the Declaration (which was signed by Seselj and Nikolic).

It could be said of Nikolic that he is a modern politician. He is young (born in 1952 in Kragujevac) and does not drink or smoke. He does not carry around the obligatory 10 kg in extra weight. This is evidenced by his nickname—Zdrale—after the crane, because he was "terribly thin." He was an athlete. He lives with his wife and two sons, ages 18 and 14, in Kragujevac in a house that he himself built. He lost his parents early and has done everything on his own, as he himself says.

He is a graduate of technical school. He has worked at "Zegrap" in Belgrade, on the Belgrade-Bar line, at the Trebisnjica river amelioration project, and at the Belgrade Underground Railroad Node. He then got a job with "22 December" in Kragujevac, where he was head of the department for investment and maintenance of the Public Works Enterprise, which included the Kragujevac Cemetery. That is why malicious tongues are inclined to say that he was a grave digger.

He says this about the shadow government: "This is a step further in SRS policy, and a step closer to power. It is a fact that through serious political work in the republican and federal assemblies we have moved closer to the ruling party, or perhaps even caught up with it. Our ministers will make serious preparations for the day when the radicals gain a majority of votes in parliament. That means that they will draw up a plan for the organization and work of their ministries, will select expert associates and thoroughly analyze all laws in their domain, as well as bills that the government will submit to the assembly in the future. Their work will have two focuses: They will criticize and attempt through amendments to improve legislation, and they will also offer to the assembly their own bills dealing with the same subject matter."

Nikolic believes that it will be interesting to follow the assembly duels between shadow ministers and ministers in power. Ministers who are not in parliament will engage in debate with their colleagues in power through the media. Obviously, the radicals are creating a team that is preparing itself and selecting among themselves the most competent people "because it is better to do that while the party is in the opposition, so that preparations can be made for a painless transition of power."

Concerning a possible victory in the next elections, he says that no one will be able to win them alone, meaning that no single party will be able to have more than half of the deputies in parliament. "No party will be presented with the opportunity any longer to be supported by the strongest opposition party with its votes. We have make this precedent possible for the socialists, but they have not known how to take advantage of this for the good of Serbia. We live with the people and know very well who has how much influence. The situation is changing every day to our benefit."

About himself he says that he has never been in an institution of authority. He was not a member of the communist party, nor has he ever governed people, nor does he think that that is the focus of his life. "It is true that at construction sites I had a large number of workers and that I will try to organize work in the government like the work of a smoothly operating construction crew."

Concerning criticism to the effect that they are close to the ruling party, Nikolic believes that that is malicious and that they are a disagreeable adversary because they have no arms against them. "They cannot tell us that we are not patriots. We taught them all about that. They joined this war after us. We have never been in power with them, we are not cooperating with them in their corrupt affairs. Our method of political struggle is completely democratic."

Despite all his obligations, Tomislav Nikolic travels every day to Kragujevac, because his family is his top priority and he cannot imagine Sunday dinner without them. He also says that he goes to church, but that he does not advertise that fact. He praises St. Dimitrije. But he also listens to pop music from the 1960's and 1970's. "That is not under the influence of my sons. Under my influence, they learned to like the group 'Metallica.'" He has no time for hobbies, but he likes to read. His favorite book is Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don,* and he is currently reading *Psychological Notes* by Dragan Krstic. It is the journal of an anticommunist, his thoughts from the 1970's. He says that it is a good book.

Military Industry Strong Despite Embargo

93BA1461C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Aug 93 pp 20-23

[Article by Edvard Popovic: "Serbia Has Not Been Broken Yet"]

[Text] One of the very few fortunate circumstances for Croatia in this war, as far as its enemy is concerned, is that the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] has not

been able to complete its transformation, that is, it has not been able to undergo metamorphosis from a defensive to an offensive army. That is, its development from the end of World War II to the death of Josip Broz was marked by the Partizan defensive doctrine. This can be concluded, first of all, from the production and storage of immense quantities of various antitank and antipersonnel mines and the intensive development of light antitank systems (bazookas, Osas, Zoljas), antiair systems (Strelas), and antilanding systems.

General Obrad Vucurovic, the father of antilanding missile systems used in this war (Plamen, Oganj, and Orkan), was developing those combat systems under the burden of a phobia about airborne landings which beset the former top Yugoslav leadership for decades after Drvar. The entire top military leadership of that time, thanks to Broz, was burdened with the memory of battles in which a poorly armed soldier was fighting modern equipment. If there was an awareness of the danger from tanks and airborne landings (whether they came from the East or the West), and there was, then antilanding and antiarmor combat would become the key idea in development of combat systems, and that idea would be the basis of military organization, deployment of units, and location of stores. That is exactly what happened. The tactician called upon Vucurovic and his associates to develop defensive combat systems, and that is what they did. Missile systems like the Plamen, Oganj, Orkan, Strela, Osa, or Zolya are envisaged for fighting an enemy who has many helicopters, aircraft, tanks, an enemy constantly in movement. In the war with Croatia, which was defending itself and which did not have a great number of aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and airborne brigades, those systems were not as effective in the hands of the Serbian Army as they were in the hands of the Croatian Army. The experience of Vukovar is the best evidence of this. The ineffectiveness of that army and of that system is also indicated by the current accusation and removal of Gen. Zivota Panic, chief of the General Staff of the "Yugoslav Army."

Transformation Into an Attacker

Creation of an offensive army after Broz's death could be felt when Admiral Branko Mamula came to head it. It was in that period that large patrol boats, that is, destroyers, typical attack vessels envisaged for battles away from the protected coastal area, were produced and included in the armament of the former JNA. That is the time when the T-84 tank was developed; it is also a markedly offensive weapon. There were plans to produce 1,000 to 1,500 such tanks, and the entire investment was based on a plan for producing 2,500 tanks, which would have paid for the entire transaction. However, 400 tanks were manufactured. It was also then that the heavy artillery system NORA (New Destructive Artillery Gun) was developed; its principal purpose is to destroy fortifications and cities. A special projectile (ERFB), with a maximum range of 39 km, was even produced for the 155-mm howitzer in that system. Transformation of the former JNA into an offensive army is also indicated by the unrealized production of the new aircraft VENA (multipurpose aircraft), which, by the time when the matter was leaked to the press, already cost several billion American dollars. This was supposed to be a heavy fighter-bomber with a payload of five tons of bombs and missiles. Such an aircraft was missing in the offensive conception of the former JNA, because the MiG's and other aircraft are exclusively defensive systems, and development of the Orao as an assault plane did not succeed—the project was not brought to fruition, nor could it meet all the tactical requirements. But on the other hand a new type of helicopter was produced. The French helicopter Gazela—which was produced at that time and which was included in armament—armed with Maljutkas, was a typical defensive system. The MIL-24 helicopter, manufactured under Russian license, is very much an assault weapon, that is, an armored gunship. It is today in the armament of the "Yugoslav Army," which is the official name of one of the three armies that arose from disintegration of the former JNA, a "job" of which Gen. Veljko Kadijevic recently boasted.

The attack on Slovenia, Croatia, and then also on Bosnia and Herzegovina exposed the background of the transformation of the former JNA. Viewed from this vantage point, the plan for creating a Great Serbia had an essential effect even on the strategy for development of the former Yugoslavia's defense industry. That is, almost every factory in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Macedonia important in the context of the defense industry has its twin in Serbia or Montenegro. When this fact is taken into account, along with the fact that Serbia looted the most important military resources of the republic seeking their future outside Yugoslavia, and the fact that the defense industry of any country is designed so that it can operate under wartime conditions (or the conditions of an embargo), then we can assume that the defense industry of Serbia (of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia") is today the only thing functioning anything like normally in that state.

Foundations in Krusik

The Krusik Factory in Valjevo is the foundation of the military industry of the "FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]." It is no accident, that is, that Gen. Zivota Panic has recently made repeated visits to that factory, which were regularly recorded by the cameras of Serbian television. One report shows the general in the exhibit room (every defense factory has such a room that can be entered only by the chosen, and in which strategic products produced in that factory are exhibited), and alongside the mines and missiles which Krusik produced even earlier, artillery shells were also exhibited in the room which it obviously has been producing in the last two years. Under the prior division of labor, the artillery ammunition seen in that shot was manufactured in Bosnian factories. Krusik was producing 60-mm and 82-mm shells, guided missiles, the Maljutka armor-piercing missile, and they also developed a missile which they called Druga or Drug, that is, the second generation of the Maljutka. At one time, they purchased the license

from the Russians for the Fagot (third generation of armor-piercing missiles), and we can assume that today they are working on an improved version of that missile. The Strela 2M surface-to-air missile, a modified version of the Russian Strela 2, which was imperfect in not being able to "recognize" what was in front of it: the sun, an infrared decoy thrown from the plane, or on the other hand a jet engine, is also being produced in Krusik. The Strela 2M recognizes the right target. Before the war, they also purchased the Russian license for the Igla, a more up-to-date air defense system which can hit approaching aircraft. At Krusik, they are also producing the air-to-surface missile Grom, very similar in its dimensions to the missile with which Banski Dvori was hit, although it is much "stupider." That is, the computer analysis of the picture, that is, automatic recognition of the target, was not successfully designed (the Grom, it is true, does have TV guidance), so that the missile remained at the level of command guidance. Going on further, at Krusik they are producing all types of fuzes, from the most primitive variants all the way to electronic fuzes.

The factory Prvi Partizan in Uzice is producing all calibers of small-arms ammunition. Sloboda in Cacak is producing ammunition for the 20-mm, 23-mm, 30-mm, 40-mm, and 57-mm antiaircraft cannon. Crvena Zastava in Kragujevac is producing all small arms—all types of pistols, revolvers, rifles, automatic rifles, and machine guns, as well as 20-mm and 23-mm antiaircraft cannon, barrels for the 30-mm Praga, barrels for the 40-mm Bofors and for the 57-mm Russian antiaircraft cannon. Calibers larger than 57-mm have not been made in Kragujevac, but with the machines they have they can in principle make barrels for heavy cannon as well. That factory, that is, was a twin of the cannon factory Bratstvo in Novi Travnik. The Serbs were exceedingly careful to have all the backup facilities in Serbia.

Rocket Fuel From Macedonia?

Prva Petoletka in Trstenik, which has a large capacity for the production of barrels, but cannot cut grooves, can help Kragujevac in the production of cannon. However, this can be done in Kragujevac—before the war, they imported machines from Czechoslovakia for the deep boring of large-caliber barrels. Perhaps, as far as the production of cannon is concerned, they are having problems with steel. The steels for heavy artillery were mainly made by Slovenian steel mills (and in the Ravne Kovale Steel Mill they also did the rough boring of cannon barrels). It is not very likely that the steel mill in Smederevo is up to that job. But a sizable number of experts at the Ravne Steel Mill were Serbs or Montenegrins who are today doing their job in the steel mills of the "FRY." Among them is Colonel Radovic, a Montenegrin who is an expert in armor and welding who at the Ravne Steel Mill worked on the turret for the T-84 tank. Matters are far better when it comes to steels for missiles and artillery ammunition, which are produced at the steel mill in Niksic.

The factory Milan Blagojevic in Lucane produces nitrocellulose gunpowders used as a charge in small-arms and artillery ammunition. Ever since they have no longer been able to count on the gunpowder factory in Vitez, the Serbs have been forced in production of ammunition to make the transition from conventional to NC [nitrocellulose] gunpowders. They have thus managed to fill ammunition for the 100-mm tank cannon (otherwise filled with nitroglycerin cannon gunpowder) with NC gunpowder—and they have completely mastered that technology. They are producing, then, almost all kinds of gunpowders, except for missile charges. The gunpowders for the missiles Orkan, Oganj, Plamen, or Grad cannot be produced—they do not have a nitroglycerin production line, and they never produced this product themselves. To be sure, there is a factory for composite rocket fuel (KRG) in Baric, a significant facility using American technology (a license was purchased from the United States) producing missile gunpowders for the missiles Fagot, Strela, or Grom, but there is no way to use that technology to master the production of gunpowders for the Oganj, Organ, or Plamen. The question is how much help they are getting today in the production of KRG from the factory Temko, which operates as a component of Makpetrol in Skopje. That factory was born as a fruit of Belgrade knowledge, and it is producing KRG from components not covered by the embargo. That fuel is used otherwise in antihail rockets, and it would not be a surprise, in view of the balance of power, that Temko is today delivering its products to Serbia.

Explosives are not a foreign idea to Serbia. Prva Iskra in Baric is the official explosives factory, which regularly produces trotyl and hexogen. Pentrite is not produced. In Ivangrad in Montenegro, plastic explosives are being produced on the basis of American technology. The Krusevac chemical complex (the factories Merima and Miloje Zakic) produces almost all the components (sulfuric and nitric acids, glycol, glycerin) needed for the production of explosives.

Kidnapping of Experts

Serbia also has the advantage of having its own production of aluminum, copper, and brass. At the aluminum combine in Podgorica, there are large presses for making immense aluminum blocks for the production of aircraft. The factory Slobodan Penezic Krcun in Sevojno (it got its name from the head of the UDB [State Security Administration], who at one time, probably by mistake, arrested Draza Mihailovic), which is a well-known combine for the processing of nonferrous metals, has been supplying brass for the production of cartridges to all the defense factories on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We should expect, however, that they are having problems producing large cartridges (for the tank cannon and for the 122- and 152-mm howitzers). They did not have such machines in Serbia, but they had to be moved from Vogosca, which was in their hands from the first day of the war. There is further evidence of this in the kidnapping of an expert who knows everything about the production of large cartridges—he was kidnapped in the

middle of Sarajevo and taken away, probably to Serbia. Perhaps they are also having problems with pyrotechnics, that is, with the production of caps; the pyrotechnics factory in Gorazde is in Muslim hands, but there is a worthy twin in Serbia. Now, the best-known experts in pyrotechnics in the former Yugoslavia were Serbs, and the technological institute that worked exclusively with pyrotechnics, explosives, gunpowders, and rocket fuels is in Belgrade, on Kalemegdan. It is not impossible that experts like Mirko Lukic and Milan Azdejkovic have in fact solved that problem.

Just as twin-factories were built in Serbia which in the field of military technology could (at least if forced to) produce everything produced in the remainder of what was then the joint state, thus Serbian personnel were also systematically trained for all areas. In Serbia today, there are more or less competent experts in all fields of the defense industry. We have already mentioned Obrad Vucurovic, creator of missile systems. Anastas Paligoric, designer of the NORA system, has in the field of heavy artillery the importance which Vucurovic once had in his field. Slobodan Jarmaz, Milojko Injac, and Dragoslav Negocic worked in his team on increasing the range of the NORA system. Velibor Jovanovic, former director of the Rocket Sector (Sector 03) of the Military Engineering Institute, who designed the Osa, belongs at the very top. The antitank system Strsljen owes its existence to Milo Cuk and Miodrag Curcin. Miloje Cvetkovic is the leading Serbian expert in internal ballistics. An entire range of specialists has been trained in the field of rocket fuels and composite materials for long-range missiles: Milos Filipovic, Djordje Blagojevic, Perica Dragicevic (at one time he taught in the Ivan Gosnjak Military School in Zagreb), Milos Colakovic (at one time chief of the sector for explosives and gunpowders in the Ivan Gosnjak Military School).... Some prestigious experts, like Veljko Jovanovic, Anastas Paligoric, distanced themselves from Milosevic's regime as early as two years ago, but there are still assistants or second-rate players who from documentation can produce what someone better than they has designed. Unfortunately, there are also superb experts who—regardless of the nature of the regime they serve (or precisely because of the nature of that regime)—will do research and develop new combat systems and improve old ones.

Thus, Serbia has probably already undertaken the project of a new helicopter with better characteristics that would be made from better materials and better technology than the MIL-24 we mentioned. Even the MIL-24 project was done exclusively in Serbian factories, and Soko of Mostar, which had done the Gazela, was completely bypassed. To that same end, an immense building was erected at one point for the assembly of helicopters at the Ivo Lola Ribar Machine Tool Factory in Zeleznik. Machines for working carbon-fiber components were purchased earlier, transmissions had been developed, but it is still not very likely that today they can produce a helicopter of a more recent generation than the MIL-24.

Collaboration With Russia

The Ivo Lola Ribar Factory is the backbone of the Serbian defense industry. It was one of the largest suppliers of machine tools to the defense industry of the former USSR. Before this war, it produced and delivered to the defense industry of the former Yugoslavia the most modern robots and manipulators for production of heavy artillery ammunition, they can produce presses for forging large components necessary for the manufacturing of airplanes, tanks, and cannon. They have produced, for example, a press unique in the world with which they produced fuel for the Orkan missile in Vitez. In general, the major machines for the needs of the former JNA were produced by that factory. And most of the debt of the former USSR to that same Yugoslavia (approximately $1.5 billion) is owed to that factory. At one time, Gen. Kadijevic attempted on the basis of that debt to import Russian Sukhoyev 27 fighter-bombers and MI-24 helicopters, which was prevented by Ante Markovic, who was prime minister at the time. That debt is actually the basis for the assumption that Russia is today collaborating with Serbia more closely than ever. According to our information, the salaries being paid to employees of Ivo Lola Ribar are coming from Russia. Aside from all that, the present Serbian regime can thank the workers of Ivo Lola Ribar for its very existence. That is, when Milosevic got the support of the workers of Lola (and he got it thanks above all to the effort of its director, Vlajko Setka), and when they went over to his side, the present Serbian regime definitively won out in Serbia.

The Serbian defense industry probably is not feeling the consequences of the embargo to the extent of conventional industry. The defense industry in Serbia is still far from collapse. It was in fact created for wartime conditions, for complete isolation. There exist wartime reserves of all strategic materials, and there is also inexpensive manpower which has been brought to the very level of subsistence, and so it does not care whether it works for 10 or 5 German marks a month. Judging by the polls in the Serbian media, there is the will to continue the war, to bring the dream of a Great Serbia to fruition. There is also the will on the part of the world community to accept and recognize the Serbian campaign against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a completely legitimate method. How it will turn out will depend, it seems, above all on the strength and readiness of the Croats to drive Great Serbia from the heads of the Serbs once and for all, at least as far as Croatian territories are concerned.

[Box, p 22]

Detailed Looting of Technology

As it was withdrawing from Slovenia, Croatia, and then also from parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former JNA pulled out a sizable portion of military technology. In Slovenia, it took away equipment of the Bregana

Repair Plant (which was actually Croatian-Slovene property), where tanks and cannon were repaired. The equipment was moved to Hadzici in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there is a twin of the Bregana Repair Plant, and then to Serbia. A sizable portion of ammunition and weapons was also taken from Slovenia at the storage facility in Muta (which along with the Macedonian small-arms and ammunition store at Calopec and the stores near Pale, Ustipraca, and Han Pijesak in central Bosnia, was one of the largest such stores in the former Yugoslavia).

The Croatian Zmaj Repair Plant in Velika Gorica was looted. They took all equipment to the Serbian twin of Zmaj—the Moma Stanojevic Repair Plant in Batajnica. The same principle, then, thorough looting, was also applied at the former Ivan Gosnjak Military Engineering Academy of the Ground Forces in Zagreb. Along with the rest, the only machine for testing missile powders, the so-called fast triggers, was taken away. They also took away one of the most powerful Packard portable computers, which had in its memory the most modern logistical program for transport guidance. In wartime, that is, it is important to transport weapons, personnel, and equipment with minimum crowding on the highways and the minimum expenditure of energy, and the Packard had information on all resources—how much fuel at each gasoline station, how much ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder, etc., in each storage facility. In the spring of 1991, logistical support in operations against Croatia was provided with the help of that computer from Banjaluka.

The Mostar Soko Airplane Factory was also looted. All the principal machines were taken away to Serbia before the war in Russian transport planes. These were French machines manufactured in the Forrest Factory, which has perfected the manufacturing of special machines without which it is unthinkable to manufacture a modern airplane.

Equipment was also withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia from the factories which were in Serbian hands from the first day. Thus, certain technological entities were taken from the artillery ammunition and missile factory Pretis in Vogosca to Crvena Zastava in Kragujevac, Krusik in Valjevo, and Miloje Zakic in Krusevac.

[Box, p 23]

The Grad, Not the Oganj

During the war in Croatia, the Serbs used some rockets which should have been destroyed long ago and were not in the armament of the JNA. Thus in the first part of the war they devastated Croatia with rockets of American origin (HVAR) produced after World War II. Those rockets were withdrawn from armament at one time, and the decision was made to melt them down in the Niksic Steel Mill. At the same time, the rockets which have been destroying Biograd, Vodice, and the Zadar-Sibenik hinterland are not Oganj rockets, but the Grad. The rocket Oganj, produced in PRETIS in Vogosca, is 120 mm in diameter, 2,600 mm long, and it weighs 67 kg. The warhead weighs 19.5 kg and contains 5,000 hardened steel pellets 6 mm in diameter. The lethal radius of the balls is 30 meters. The rocket, then, is not intended for destruction of fortifications and cities, but for "hitting live targets," as the manuals say. It is particularly effective against landings and beachheads or groups of soldiers in staging zones. Until quite recently, when it was introduced as the Model M88, the rocket Grad was not part of the arsenal of the JNA. It was produced in industrial cooperation with Czechoslovakia for Iraq and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. It is quite similar to the Oganj, smaller in caliber (122-mm). It has a destructive warhead. It is a typical offensive rocket. It is made in runs of 20,000, and there have been at least 20 such runs (the former Federal Directorate for Sales in Belgrade, which traded in "special-purpose goods," that is, arms, obviously rationed some of the Oganj produced in Serbian warehouses). It is fired from a launcher that is produced in Russia, Bulgaria, Armenia, and the Czech Republic. The Czech launcher is the most improved. It can also be fired from the Oganj launcher. That is, seven years ago a plastic tube was made to make up the difference in caliber between the launcher and the rocket (128-mm and 122-mm). The plastic sleeve was made in Komnik in Slovenia, but only one kit was made for each vehicle—32 pieces. Machines which can produce those plastic sleeves also exist in Prilep. It is assumed that the Serbs are firing the Grad rocket from that kind of modified Oganj launcher or have on the other hand acquired launchers from the Grad. The Czech vehicle costs some $400,000 and the Russian $150,000.

Kosovo

Serbian Authorities Introduce Food Rationing

AU2409063393 Tirana RILINDJA in Albaian 22 Sep 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Food Distribution With Ration Cards Begins"]

[Text] Yesterday in Prishtina, the Serbian authorities began distributing food with ration cards according to the decree of the Belgrade government. Distribution is taking place at the stors of the Vogar and Germia enterprises, which are managed by Serbian individuals appointed by Serbia. People were observed waiting in line in ffront of these stores yesterday. Dr. Hajrullah Gorani, chairman on the Kosova Independent Trade Unions, said at a news conference two weeks ago that the Albanians too should receive these ration cards. The Albanian political parties in Kosova have not come out publicly in favor of either accepting or refusing these ration cards. We have heard unofficially that some Albanian political parties have suggested to their members and supporters that they should accept the ration cards, but without any kind of political conditions. The Kosova Information Center reports that the Serbian media, in their campaign about the ration cards, has sometimes tried to exploit these supplies for political purposes.